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Abstract 
The Democratic Party, which once dominated the support of Hong Kong 
electorate, declined in electoral support recently. Its vote share in legislative election 
decreased from 52.3% in 1991 to 34.7% in 2000. This dissertation discusses the 
electoral decline of the Democratic Party as one important indicator of the electoral 
change of Hong Kong. The thesis makes use of both aggregate and individual level 
data to investigate how and why has the party declined. Particularly, the Public Affairs 
Survey 2000, a territory-wide election survey in Hong Kong, provides the major 
database of the study. The survey data shows even a more volatile electorate that the 
aggregate vote share data suggests. About half of supporters of the Democratic Party 
in 1998 did not vote for it in 2000, and among which, number of voters switched to 
other candidates or parties is comparable to those who abstained. 
The electoral decline of the Democratic Party happened under the background of 
a volatile electorate and fragmented party system in the Hong Kong's early stage of 
democratization. This study suggests that the partial democratization, the sovereignty 
change and the governing crises are the fundamental context within which the 
electoral change of the territory takes place. The contextual changes result in the 
changes of political attitudes of the public. Change in political attitudes is 
hypothesized to affect electoral change of the mass. The decline in electoral support 
for the Democratic Party represents an important component of the overall electoral 
change. Attitude to democracy and trust in the Hong Kong government are the two 
major political attitudes which are found to be effective in the exit of voters of the 
Democratic Party. A logistic regression analysis finally demonstrates that the exit of 
original supporters of the Democratic Party are due to their lower support of 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY, once having dominated the popular support in Hong 
Kong, declined substantially in electoral support in recent years. It serves as an 
important indicator to show that the electorate of Hong Kong is undergoing change. 
This dissertation demonstrates the change of Hong Kong electorate and the electoral 
decline of Democratic Party and tries to relate them with the changes in political 
attitudes of Hong Kong people in the changing society. 
The purpose of this study is two-folded: how and why. How does the electoral 
decline of DP happen? The study tries to present a detailed picture describing the 
electoral decline of Democratic Party in the context of a changing Hong Kong 
electorate. Why is the change? The study explains the electoral decline by looking at 
political attitudinal changes. 
Not only by aggregate vote share data and other societal level data, the study 
examines the relationship between changes of voting behavior of individuals and their 
political attitudes with the help of individual-level survey data as well. The Public 
Affairs Survey 2000 is the major database of this study. It is a territory-wide survey 
conducted by the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies at the Chinese 
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University of Hong Kong. The interviews were held after the election of Legislative 
Council on September 2000. It reports the voting behaviors of the respondents in the 
current election as well as in the last election in 1998. Moreover, it accounts 
extensively about respondents' different political attitudes and it provides the 
opportunity to explore its relationship with the change of voter behavior. The result 
confirms the association between the two. 
A step forward, this study suggests the changes in political attitudes are related 
with the societal changes of Hong Kong. Under important political changes of 
democratization and sovereignty handover, the political attitudes of Hong Kong 
people change too. Attitudes related with trust in Beijing and the local government of 
the Special Administrative Region, and support to democracy, change with the 
changing society. And the attitudinal changes finally bring the change in voting 
behavior, i.e. the electoral decline of DP. 
The history of democratic elections with universal suffrage in Hong Kong has 
not been long. Still, this has already attracted numerous scholars to study. These 
studies mainly concentrate on voter turnout and voter choice in single election. 
Electoral change in Hong Kong has not been paid adequate attention so far. This study 
tries to complement the picture of Hong Kong voters by a longitudinal perspective. 
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The electoral decline of the Democratic Party is not a matter of one political 
party or a small group of people, but it reflects and hints about the change of Hong 
Kong voters and people and the political scene as a whole, so it is too important to 
ignore. 
Plan of the Dissertation 
To answer "how is the change?" will be the task of the next chapter, Chapter Two. 
By both aggregate and individual data, it describes how the electoral support of DP 
declined in the background of a changing Hong Kong electorate. 
Chapters Three to Five will answer the question "why is the electoral decline?" 
Chapter Three will look for hints to explain the electoral decline by reviewing 
previous studies on several areas. Experience of electoral change in western 
democracies is a good start. Moreover, major studies of voting behaviors will be 
looked upon to find any relevant factors. At last, studies of Hong Kong voting 
behavior will be included to fit the unique context of the territory. 
Based on the hints given, Chapter Four will present my own speculation in 
explaining the electoral decline. Political changes in Hong Kong are suggested to be 
the fundamental sources of electoral change. They include the democratization, 
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sovereignty change and governing crises in the 1990s. Political changes bring the 
changes in political attitudes of the mass. Trust in Beijing, attitude to democracy and 
trust in SAR government are recommended to be political attitudes that matter for the 
exit of DP supporters. 
Hypotheses proposed will be investigated empirically in Chapter Five. Based on 
the survey data provided by the Public Affairs Survey 2000, regression analysis will 
be done to find out the effect of political attitudes on the exit of DP supporters. Both 
bivariate and multivariate analysis will be included. 
Chapter Six is the concluding chapter. All elements in the dissertation will be put 
together to tell a consistent story. Limitations, implications and contributions of this 
study will be discussed in details. By the result of this study, what can we tell about 
the mass, voters and political parties of Hong Kong? 
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Chapter Two 
Demonstrating The Electoral Decline 
This chapter describes how the electoral support of DP declines. First, it demonstrates 
the overall change of Hong Kong electorate in the 1990s. One of the significant trends 
of the overall change is the electoral decline of DP. Secondly, the electoral decline of 
DP will be described in details using both aggregate vote share and individual survey 
data. 
The Changing Hong Kong Electorate 
Hong Kong still undergoes democratization. It transforms from the 
"administrative absorption of politics" (King 1981) to the partial democracy (Lau and 
Kuan 2000). Direct election in Hong Kong has a history of just about one decade. 
Political elites and mass are still learning about the democratic game. Some either 
play individually as independent candidates, or collectively as members of political 
parties. In order to win elections, they have to get support from the mass by adjusting 
political stances and skills. At the same time, the mass chooses candidates who can 
really represent their interests. Therefore, it is a period of "mutual searching", in 
which independent politicians and political parties search "their" mass, and mass 
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search "their" politicians or political parties. 
In the time of "mutual searching", however, there are full of trials and errors. 
They constitute a high electoral volatility of Hong Kong in the past decade. Table 2.1 
shows the vote shares in the past four elections of legislature. Obviously, Hong 
Kong's electorate does not show a stable pattern. 
Table 2.1 Vote Shares 1991-2000 
Political Party/ 1991 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 8 ' 2000 
Organization  
^ 52.3 (U(二5)1) 41.9 42.9 34.7 
DAB ™ 15.4 25.2 29.4 
ADPL 4.4 9.5 4.7 4.7 
TF … — 12.6 15.1 
LP ™ 1.6 3.4 1.9 
HKPA - 2.8 - 0.7 
LDF 5.1 1.3 
Political parties and 
organizations with 15.6 3.7 ___ 
only one candidate 
Other political parties 
and organizations ^ ^ 
with more than one G.9 2.0 4.8 2.9 
candidate Independents 21.6 20.7 6.3 
Note: A double-ballot electoral system was used in 1991. All vote shares in that year are the total 
ballots of the party divided by total number of ballots. 
Several observations can be made. First, vote shares of political parties are not 
stable, especially DP and DAB, the two main political parties with the highest vote 
share. For those small parties, they have relatively stable vote shares. However, their 
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vote shares are too low to be significant. For example, ADPL got more or less about 
5% of vote share in the past four elections (except inl995, it got 9.5%), but the 
percentage was just about one-twentieth. 
Second, the electorate is very fragmented though the situation is improving. It 
can be shown by the high but decreasing vote shares of "political parties and 
organizations with only one candidate" and "independents". Vote share of the former 
is at its highest in 1991 (15.6%) and reduce to zero in 1998 and 2000. Vote share of 
"independents" also reached its highest in 1991 (21.6%) and the lowest in 1998 
(6.3%). In 2000, there is a slight increase to 9.8%. This shows a lot of politicians still 
participate independently or, collectively in small scale. At the same time, a 
significant portion of mass supports independents and small parties. However, the 
trend of the vote shares of them is decreasing. It means that more politicians are 
willing to participate in election through political parties, and a higher portion of mass 
are willing to cast their votes on big parties rather than independents or small parties. 
Third, political parties are still young and experiencing integration. Most of the 
important political parties have been established less than ten years. DAB was 
founded in 1992. LP was founded in 1993. DP was founded in 1994 and was the joint 
force of UDHK and MP. (The figure of DP in 1991 is the sum of vote shares of 
UDHK and MP.) HKPA was founded in 1994 and LDF joined under its name in 1997. 
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TF was founded in 1996. The rise of new political parties and continuing integration 
among them increase electoral volatility. There are also cases of entrance and exit of 
politicians among political parties. For example, Lau Kong Wah, now a member of 
DAB, was once the member of UDHK. He ran in the election of 1991 under the name 
of UDHK, but failed. In 1995，he left UDHK and joined the Civil Force. He failed 
again. In 1998 and 2000, he joined DAB and was elected. All these constitute the high 
electoral volatility of Hong Kong. 
Applying the Pederson Index, a common tool measuring electoral volatility, 
Hong Kong's electoral volatility can be compared with other countries. Pederson 
Index is one half the sum of the vote shares for new parties plus the percentage gained 
by parties that increased their vote share since the last election. i The higher the index, 
the higher the electoral volatility is and vice versa. The indexes are 26.5, 27.5 and 
11.3 in 1995, 1998 and 2000 respectively. (Since the index is calculated by 
comparison with the previous election, there is no index in 1991.) The mean is 21.8. 
Table 2.2 shows the indexes of some democratic countries. They are separated 
into two groups: western democracies which include US and Western Europe, and 
Latin American countries. Electoral volatilities of western democracies, in general, 
are lower than those of Latin American countries. Europe has a mean index of 8.6 in 
1 For details of rules for calculation, see Bartolini and Mair (1990，311-2). 
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the last century, while Latin America scores 19.6 in 1980s and 23.2 in 1990s. Hong 
Table 2.2 Electoral Volatility (Pederson Index): Comparative Figures 
Country or Region (Year) Mean Pederson Index 
Western Democracies 
Switzerland (1951-95) 4.8 
Austria (1945-95) 5.6 
United Kingdom (1950-92) 6.2 
Australia (1951-96) 6.5 
Ireland (1951-92) 8.3 
Belgium (1949-95) 8.4 
New Zealand (1953-96) 9.1 
Netherlands (1948-94) 9.7 
United States (1952-96) 11.3 
Canada (1953-93) 11.6 
Spain (1979-93) 14.7 
Europe (1885-1995) 8.6 





Costa Rica 12.3 
Argentina 13.2 
Mexico 14.8 









Latin America (1980s) 19.6 
Latin America 099Qs)  
Sources: For western democracies, calculated or adapted from Karvonen et al. (2001). For Europe, 
Bartoini and Mair (1990，68). For Latin America, Roberts and Wibbels (1999’ 576-7). 
Kong has a volatile electorate more comparable to Latin America than western 
democracies. Compared with western democracies, Hong Kong's electoral volatility 
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is undoubtedly high. However, if compared with Latin American countries, Hong 
Kong is more or less in the middle. Some regimes like Nicaragua, Peru and Panama, 
their electoral volatility even reach above 40 or 50. Electoral volatility of Hong Kong 
is high, but not in an exceptional way. 
Meanwhile, Hong Kong's electoral volatility is decreasing in terms of the 
Pederson Indexes. Does it suggest our electorate is becoming more stable? Since the 
comparison is done merely based on three figures of Pederson Index, we are not sure 
whether the electoral decline in 2000 is a deviant case. A real trend can be told only if 
more elections are observed. However, in the light of the decline of vote shares of 
independents and minor parties, it is reasonable to assume Hong Kong's party system 
and electorate is moving towards a more stable pattern. 
The Electoral Decline of DP 
We have seen that the electorate in Hong Kong is volatile and the party system is 
fragmented. Meanwhile, the volatility of electorate and the fragmentation of the party 
system seem to be decreasing. Can we tell more about the direction of the change? 
Yes, we can tell DAB wins and DP loses in this period of "mutual searching". The 
changes of vote shares of the two parties give us important hints about the overall 
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change of the Hong Kong electorate. 
In the past three elections since 1995, DP and DAB together made up a mean of 
63.2% of vote shares, about two-third of the total. However, the vote share of DP 
dropped by 17.6% from 52.3% in 1991 to 34.7% in 2000. In the meantime, the vote 
share of DAB has experienced 14% growth from 15.4% in 1995 to 29.4% in 2000. 
Compared to other political parties, the changes of vote shares of the two parties are 
dramatic. TF has a 2.5% rise only in 2000. The maximum rise of ADPL is in 1995, 
but just 5.1%. It has just a 0.3% rise if compared between 1991 and 2000. The voter 
shares of other parties have changed less than 3%. 
It would be easy to assume that voters of DP have switched to DAB. However, it 
is not the true picture. In the following, I will focus on the change of DP between 
1998 and 2000 elections. Figure 2.1 shows the number of votes received by different 
political parties and the number of total voters in the five constituencies in 1998 and 
2000. Different from the previous data, it shows the actual amount of votes received 
by candidates, instead of percentage of votes received over total votes. Due to 
different voter turnouts in different elections, actual amount of votes gives a more 
accurate picture than percentage. Moreover, it separates the votes into five 
constituencies, instead of taking the totals. Since not all political parties presented 
candidates in all constituencies, using overall vote share would underestimate the 
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significance of some political parties which only concentrated in some constituencies. 
Figure 2.1 Actual Votes in Five Constituencies: 1998 and 2000 
Hong Kong Island (HKI) New Territories West (NTW) 
400000(1" 400000||  
300000 rp；- 300000 I -
200000 I _ 01998 200000— f - • 1998 
IQOQOO f L p . 一 100000 n W n ^ — — ’ 
Q 麗 n , m … Q , - l r n . n l , a 
DP DAB TF Others Total DP DAB TF Others Total 
Kowloon West (KW) New Territories East (NTE) 
2 5 _ | j 400000[] - 1 
細 00 ~ ^ r t 300000 r t r 
150000 - � -
100000 n t " ： 二 • 誦。 
麵 W f f l — 丨 _ 誦。 r r i ^ r y - r f i I • ™ 
•IJJ • �I U qIIJ i 1_J I l_J L I � I 1.1 _ • 
DP DAB ADPL Others Total DP DAB TF Others Total 
Kowloon East (KE) 
300000|1  
2500001 H t 
200000' I -
150000'"pp I - 01998 
100000'" h i H :: - jmooo 
細 J F l d i b d l U 
DP DAB Others Total 
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The figure shows the overall electorate change is more complicated than that voters of 
DP switch to DAB. In all five constituencies, the vote share of DP drops, but the 
decline is not at the same rate in all districts. It drops most severely in HKI (with a 
decline of 51769 votes), while it drops least in NTE (with a decline of 9416 votes). 
On the other hand, DAB actually does not receive an increase of actual votes in all 
districts. It gains only in NTW and NTE. In other three districts, its votes decline 
instead. In HKI, it has a drop of 17565 votes. In KW and KE, the drop is 2690 and 
709 respectively. It means DAB does not receive votes from DP directly. 
Then, where do voters of DP go? One way is abstention, i.e. don't vote in 2000, 
at least from the hints given by the figure. In all five districts, number of total voters 
decreases, from the least 20487 in NTE to the highest 44047 in HKI. NTE is the 
district in that DP has the least drop, while HKI the greatest. Therefore, a greater 
electoral decline of DP gives a greater drop in total voters. This suggests many voters 
of DP don't vote in 2000. 
Another way is switching choice. Among the various choices, TF and ADPL 
seems to be favorable alternatives for voters leaving DP. In HKI, DP drops and TF 
gains. In KW, DP drops and ADPL gains. In NTW, DP drops and TF and DAB gain. 
The gain of DAB in NTW is not likely from DP, but from "others". In 1998, Heung 
Yee Kuk, headed by Lam Wai Keung had a single list received 25905 votes in NTW. 
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In 2000, it did not have candidate in the same district. However, Tang Siu Tong, with 
a strong support in rural area, joined the list of DAB in NTW this time. It is 
reasonable to assume the former supporters of Heung Yee Kuk turned to this joint list. 
However, the picture is not so simple. For example, NTE is a complicated case. 
In this constituency, DP has the least decline, while TF has suffered a greater decline 
instead. Following the previous logic, therefore, we cannot conclude that DP voters 
switched to TF. In the meantime, DAB and "others" gain, should we conclude that 
voters of DP leave to DAB and "others"? Not necessarily. It should be noted that the 
pattern of aggregate change just gives us some hints about the picture behind, but 
does not tell us about the individual change of voters automatically. Therefore, we 
should look into survey data in order to ascertain the pattern of individual change 
before we draw a conclusion. Although the 2000 election did show the electoral 
decline of DP and the rise of DAB, it would be oversimplified to conclude that DP 
supports have switched to DAB, even the aggregate data strongly disagrees with this. 
Aggregate vs. Individual Changes 
Before looking into individual changes suggested by the survey data, we should 
be clear about the difference and relationship between aggregate change and 
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individual change. Aggregate change refers to the change of overall vote shares of 
candidates between elections. On the other hand, individual change means the change 
of individual's voting decision between elections. 
The two levels of instability are related, but fundamentally different. We can say 
that aggregate change is the sum of all individual changes. Therefore, if no individual 
changes, there will be no aggregate changes. Yet when there are individual changes, it 
does not necessarily to bring about aggregate changes. It is because the effect of 
individual changes will be offset if they are in opposite directions. If voter X changes 
support from party A to party B, and at the same time, voter Y changes support from 
party B to party A, then both party A and party B would not have an aggregate change 
in vote shares at all. For that reason, a 30% increase in aggregate change of vote 
shares of party A, together with a 30% decrease of party B，can be a result of infinite 
possibilities: 30% change from B to A，40% from B to A together with 10% from A 
to B, 50% from B to A together with 20% from A to B... Aggregate change is an 
indicator of instability of voting pattern which offers a good starting point for us to 
see the phenomenon. However, in order to figure out what has really happened behind 
the scene and the cause of the change, we should look into individual changes. 
Therefore, while aggregate stability does not imply individual stability, aggregate 
volatility must imply individual volatility. It has been demonstrated that Hong Kong 
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has a high electoral volatility at aggregate level, and hence a high (or even higher) 
volatility at individual level. The Public Affairs Survey 2000 provides good evidence. 
In Public Affairs Survey 2000, respondents were asked to report their voting 
behavior in 2000 by several questions: 
參 Have you registered as electors? 
• If yes, have you voted? 
• If yes, which party or candidate have you voted? 
Similar set of questions was asked concerning the election in 1998. These sets of 
questions divide respondents into "un-registered respondents", "registered but 
non-voters" and "voters with known choices". All others are considered as missing 
data, including those who forgot or refused to answer, or gave invalid answers (e.g. 
prevailing a choice of particular party which did not have a candidate in that 
constituency). 
All respondents can then be classified into: 1. voting for the same party 
(reporting same choice in both election); 2. switching choices (reporting different 
choices in two elections); 3. (re)entering electorate (did not vote in 1998，but vote in 
2000); 4. leaving electorate (voted in 1998, but did not vote in 2000); 5. non-voters 
(did not vote in both elections). There is one more category for those did vote in both 
16 
Figure 2.2 Stability and Change of Hong Kong Voters: 1998 and 2000 
Voters In both elections 
/ \ 
Non-voters ， 45% 
W / (Re)Entering Electorate ^ ^ 12% 
Leaving Electorate 
12% 
Note: Excludes respondents who answer "forget/don't answer" in either e lect ion.�N= 1717) 
Vote in both elections but 
forget either choice 
18% ^ ^ V o t i n g for the same party 
25% 
Leaving Electorate \ / \ 21% \ / \ 
\ / \ / Switching choices \ / ^ 14% 
(Re)Entering Electorate 
22% 
Note: Excludes respondents who are non-voters in both elections and answering "forget/don't answer" in either election (A^=943) 
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elections but forget either choice (especially in 1998). It is included because it 
consists of a sizable proportion of total respondents. The result is shown in figure 2.2. 
Without surprise, looking at the first chart, the largest sector is non-voters in both 
elections (45%). In other words, 55% of our adult populations had voted in 1998 or 
2000. Among the voters, 31% have voted in both elections, and 12% have only voted 
in 1998 (leaving electorate), and 12% have only voted in 2000 ((re)entering 
electorate). 
Focusing only on those who have voted, (see the lower pie-chart in figure 2.2 
which excludes non-voters in both elections), voting for the same party merely 
accounted for 25% of all voters. The percentage is very low. 
While Pederson Index is widely adopted to measure aggregate volatility, there is 
no common measurement for individual volatility. Different scholars use different 
measurements. Therefore, we can only make limited comparison. In Canada, 
Lawrence Leduc (1985: 416) reports 55% and 68% of electorate voting for the same 
party in 1974/79 and 1979/80 elections respectively. The percentages are calculated 
excluding non-voters in both elections. The figures are therefore more comparable to 
those mentioned in the second chart of figure 2.2. Hong Kong's volatility at the 
individual level is much 
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Table 2.3 Individual Volatility: Percentage of Party-Switchers in Five  
English-speaking Democracies 
Country (Year) Individual Volatility ( M ^ ) 
United Kingdom (1964-92) 159 
New Zealand (1972-93) 20 3 
Australia (1984-96) 20 7 
United States (1952-92) 21 9 
Canada (1965-93) 29:2 
Source: Calculated from Katz in Karvonen et al. (2001，75). 
higher than Canada. Richard S. Katz (2001) uses percentage of party-changers as an 
indicator of individual volatility instead. He studies five English-speaking 
democracies namely Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom and United 
States. Their mean figures are shown in Table 2.3. “[T]hose move in and out of the 
electorate (either because of coming of age/death or simple failure to vote in one of 
the two elections)" are excluded in the study. For comparison, Hong Kong's score of 
individual volatility should be 35.6.2 Again, it is higher than all five countries. All 
these show Hong Kong electorate is volatile at the individual level compared to 
western democracies. 
1 二 o f voting for the same party is 237. Number of switching parties is 131. Individual volatility =131/ (237+131) = 0.356. 
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The DP Voters 
In this part, I will focus on DP voters compared with other political parties in 
1998 and 2000 Legco elections. We want to know: How many are consistent voters 
who voted for DP in both elections? How many are leaving voters who voted for DP 
in 1998 but did not in 2000? Among those who have left DP, how many have 
switched to other parties or candidates, and how many became to non-voters? How 
many are entering voters who did not vote for DP in 1998 but did in 2000? Among 
those who entered DP, how many are from other parties or candidates, and how many 
are from non-voters? Moreover, among those who switched choices, which party 
(parties) were they more likely to switch to? 
Due to limited influence of other political parties in direct election, only four 
major political parties are chosen for study, namely DP, DAB, TF and ADPL. Figure 
2.3-6 shows the compositions of voters of the four parties. 
Among those who have voted for DP in 1998 and/or 2000, only 34% are 
consistent voters who voted for DP in both elections. However, compared to other 
three parties, the percentage is the highest. For DAB, TF and ADPL, consistent voters 
just make up of 28%, 11% and 22% respectively. This shows DP actually has the 
highest number of loyal voters. This is very different from our common perception. It 
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is commonly believed that DAB, compared to other political parties, has the highest 
number of "iron-votes" which mean loyalty votes. Especially in 2000，DAB still got 
high number of votes, despite of the scandal of Cheng Kai Nam (vice-president 
Figure 2.3 Stability and Change of DP voters in the 1998 and 2000 
Elections (N = 382) 
Unknown choice 
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Figure 2.4 Stability and Change of DAB voters in the 1998 and 2000 
Elections (N = 278) 
Unknown choice 
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Figure 2.5 Stability and Change of TF voters in the 1998 and 2000 
Elections (N = 135) 
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Figure 2.6 Stability and Change of ADPL voters in the 1998 and 
2000 Elections (N = 41) 
Unknown choice 
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and first candidate of the list in HK district). This was always interpreted as the result 
of the DAB'S "iron-votes" effect. However, from our figures, it seems that the DP 
have more "iron-votes" of the DP than the DAB! 
Of course, leaving voters are more than entering voters for the DP which resulted 
in aggregate decline in vote share. Since the DP is the only party with aggregate 
decline of vote share, other parties have more entering voters than leaving voters. 
Among the leaving voters of the DP, more have chosen other parties or candidates 
(190/0) than to be non-voters (16%). However, the difference is small. On the other 
hand，more entering voters come from non-voters (17%) than from other parties or 
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candidates (6%). The difference is quite large. It means, at least in 2000, the DP 
attracts more non-voters, than voters from other parties, but loses voters quite severely 
to both non-voters, and other parties or candidates. 
The pictures of entrance and exit of voters are quite different among different 
political parties. For the DAB, among its leaving voters, more turned to be non-voters 
(140/0) instead of supporting other parties or candidates (5%). On the other hand, same 
as DP, entering voters are more likely from non-voters (19%) than other parties or 
candidates (10%). This shows voters of the DAB are more likely to switch between 
voters and non-voters, instead of switch between different parties and candidates. In 
the case of TF, more voters have left to other parties or candidates (15%) than 
abstaining (7%). The percentages of entering voters from non-voters (21%) and from 
other parties or candidates (26%) are more comparable. For the ADPL, again, more 
voters leave to other parties or candidates (17%) rather than to non-voters (10%). At 
the same time, more entering voters come from other parties or candidates (29%) 
rather than from non-voters (15%). 
There seems to be no clear pattern of voter movements of different political 
parties. But I think this non-pattern is consistent with the previous observation. Since 
Hong Kong is still at the embryo stage of electoral politics, voters try and err. This 
results in the chaotic picture about voters in or out of electorate, and among different 
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political parties. The only thing can be told is voters move in all directions without a 
single salient pattern. For all political parties, a sizeable portion of voters exits the 
electorate. At the same time, there are quite a large number of voters moving in. Many 
voters shift parties, and this happen in all political parties, not confined to the DP. Of 
course, at least in the election of 2000, the net result of all the individual changes is 
the electoral decline of DP. Except this, it seems we cannot tell any more. 
One more point should be noted. I include respondents who "did vote in 
elections but forget the choice" into calculation. Because the information about 1998 
election relies on memory of respondents, there must be chances of forgetting the 
choices. I include such respondents because they did vote. Although they fail to tell 
their choices, their turnouts only are still valuable in understanding the electorate. The 
highest percentage of this kind of respondents is DAB (24%), followed by TF (20%), 
DP (8%) and ADPL (7%). It is reasonable to think the more cautious one decide the 
vote，the less likely one would forget the choice. In this sense, voters of the DAB are 
the most who do not vote cautiously. 
Where did voters of the DP leave? We already have a rough idea by looking at 
the aggregate vote share data. It generally suggests that voters of DP more likely go to 
TF and the ADPL, instead of the DAB. Is it true even at the individual level? Yes, as 
suggested by Table 2.4. 
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Table 2.4 Leaving Voters of DP in Five Constituencies 
Constitue Destination of leaving voters (%) 
ncy TF ADPL DAB Others Non-voters N 
HK 16 ™ 16 24 44 25 
KW — 47 5 — 47 19 
KE — — 27 8 65 26 
NTW 43 ™ 14 6 37 35 
NTE 31 --- 7 21 41 29 
Togi! H Z 14 12 46 134 
Taking all leaving voters of the DP, most of them abstained (46%), the next 
switched to TF (21%), then DAB (14%), others (12%) and the last ADPL (7%). 
However, this is not a good indicator telling the actual preferences of voters, because 
not all political parties participated in all constituencies. The figures just show the 
total voters received by certain political parties divided by all leaving voters. So, 
leaving voters of the DP of different constituencies are separated. The picture would 
be clearer and fitting the observation by the aggregate data. 
Excluding the category of "others" (because it includes too many variety of 
candidates without a clear meaning), TF or ADPL received more voters from the DP 
than the DAB in all districts in which they participated, except in HKL In KW, ADPL 
received 45% of voters from the DP, while the DAB only got 5%. In NTW, it was 
430/0 for TF and only 14% for DAB. In NTE, it was 31% for TF and only 7% for the 
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DAB. 
Comparison cannot be made in KE since there is no candidate for TF and the 
ADPL. But we should notice that KE is the district that most leaving voters chose not 
to vote. This shows in the absence of TF and ADPL participation, voters of the DP are 
more likely to abstain rather than casting vote on the DAB. 
HKI is the most deviant case. In this constituency, most of the leaving voters 
switch to "others" (24%), and TF and the DAB the second. The percentage of 
switching voters to "others" is the highest among five constituencies. This may be due 
to the unpopularity of TF candidate, Cyd Ho Sau Lan, compared with other TF 
candidates in other constituencies. Ho was once the assistant of the popular legislator 
Emily Lau. In 1998，Lau leaded Ho participating in the legislative election in NTE. 
With a high vote share of their joint list, Lau and Ho were both elected under the 
proportional representation voting system. In 2000, Ho, gaining two years of 
popularity, participated in legislative election again, but alone in HKI this time. 
However, this young legislator, nevertheless, experienced a keen competition with 
other independent candidates with not weak popular support in the same constituency, 
including Jennifer Chow Kit Bing，a long-time District Board member and ex-Urban 
Councilor, David Lan Hung Tsung, ex-Secretary of Home Affairs of the SAR 
government, and Fung Leung Lo, a popular writer. Moreover, these independents 
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have a rather moderate political stance. Therefore, considering the popularity of 
candidates as well, voters in HKI had several choices other than TF. The percentage 
of leaving voters switching to TF is, therefore, lower in HKI. 
After looking into various data, we get an answer of "how is the electoral 
decline?" We clearly see that Hong Kong's electoral politics is now experiencing a 
change. Both the party system and the electorate are unstable. The party system is 
fragmented. The electorate is volatile. During the change, the DP is the greatest loser. 
Since the DP is still the political party with widest support in Hong Kong, its electoral 
decline can hint the direction of the change of Hong Kong electorate. The reason(s) 
behind the DP's electoral decline also implies the thrust of the change of Hong Kong 
electorate. It constitutes the next research question of this dissertation: Why is the 
electoral decline of DP? 
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Chapter Three 
Explaining The Electoral Decline: Hints From Literature 
In this chapter, the literature on electoral change and voting behavior will be 
examined, in order to discover hint to explain the electoral decline of DP. The chapter 
is divided into three parts. The general phenomenon of electoral change in western 
democracies will first be discussed. Studies of voting behavior will be reviewed in the 
second part, in order to find out major factors in determining the behavior. For the 
special context of Hong Kong, relevant studies in Hong Kong will be examined in the 
last part. 
Electoral Change in Western Democracies 
In most western democracies, electoral patterns are generally stable before the 
1960s. Party Systems and Voter Alignment (Lipset and Rokkan 1967) is the best 
volume to demonstrate this phenomenon. It suggests that political parties in Western 
European polities emerged and stabilized through the 1920s to the 1960s. The 
stability can be shown in two ways: stable vote shares of political parties and stable 
cleavage-bases behind the support of political parties. Four basic social cleavages 
could be identified: center-periphery, church-state, land-industry and 
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capitalists-workers. 
From the 1960s onwards, the picture changed. In some western democracies, the 
party and cleavage systems destabilized. Party systems fractionalized due to the 
emergence of many small political parties. Moreover, electorates became more 
volatile (Dalton et al. 1985: 8-10). 
Cleavage systems changed too. The long-established Left-Right cleavage was 
weakened. Traditionally, the working class tended to vote for leftist parties, while the 
middle class tended to vote for rightist parties. However, this pattern changed largely 
in the past few decades. The decline of the Alford Class Voting Index, which is the 
difference by subtracting the percentage of non-manual respondents voting for the 
Left from the percentage of manual respondents voting for the Left, in most western 
democracies is the strongest evidence. For example, in US, the index dropped from 
+44 in 1948 to +1 in 1992. In Britain, it dropped from +40 in 1950 to +24 in 1990. In 
West Germany, it dropped from +30 in 1953 to +14 in 1990 (Inglehart 1997:255). 
At the same time, new cleavages have emerged. The most salient one is the 
materialist/ postmaterialist cleavage (Inglehart 1977; 1984; 1997). Simply speaking, 
materialist value refers to ideas related to survival needs, including "fight rising 
prices", "strong defense forces", "economic growth", "stable economy", "fight 
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against crime" and "maintain order". Postmaterialist value refers to those linking 
belonging, self-expression, and intellectual and aesthetic satisfaction: "more say on 
the job", "less impersonal society", "ideas count", "more say in government" and 
"freedom of speech" (1997: 108-9). This cleavage is found to be more and more 
important in determining people's voting behavior. People with postmaterialist value 
are more likely to vote for the Leftist than those with materialist value. This tendency 
is even stronger than that of class (1985: 64). 
This shift from the old political cleavages to the new one makes western 
democracies experience an electoral change. Periods of electoral change in western 
democracies are commonly classified into stable alignment, dealignment and 
realignment. Stable alignment means "constancy in party coalitions and aggregate 
partisan equilibrium" (Dalton 1984:11). Vote shares of political parties are more or 
less the same between elections. Party system is generally stable. Dealignment is the 
"preliminary step in a realignment process — the weakening of old party loyalties to 
facilitate a new party alignment" (p. 14). In this period, vote shares of political parties 
became unstable. Electorate became volatile. Switching choices are common. New 
political parties may emerge. Realignment is the "significant shift in the group among 
the parties as a result" (p. 13). This period is similar to that of stable alignment. Vote 
shares of political parties and party systems are stable. Because the new political 
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cleavages are established in place of the old ones, electorate stabilized. Therefore, 
realignment can be labeled as another period of stable alignment. The three periods 
have a unique sequence: stable alignment, then dealignment, and lastly realignment. 
However, it does not imply all countries should undergo the three periods of electoral 
change. For example, France (the Fifth Republic) and Canada have quite stable party 
alignment. (Dalton 1984, Ch. 13 and 14) There is no hypothesis to tell when and how 
long a country would experience which period of electoral change. However, once a 
country undergoes electoral change, it certainly follows the sequence mentioned. 
Why do western democracies experience electoral change? Dalton, Beck and 
Flanagan (1985) offer a very good summary of different models to explain the change. 
Models include "Embourgeoisement", "Social Mobility Thesis", "Mass Society 
Thesis", "Community Integration", "Cognitive Mobilization", “Aging Party System" 
and "Value Change". 
“Embourgeoisement” and “Social Mobility Thesis” base on economic 
explanation of electoral behavior. Both of them argue that "blurring of traditional 
class lines" in contemporary societies bring about the electoral change (p. 16). The 
former model suggests that when the society generally became prosperous, working 
class and middle class turn to be similar in income and life-styles. The latter model 
proposes that the increasing social mobility made most people's social status different 
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from that of their parents. This weakens voters' class loyalty which in turn enhances 
the likeliness of electoral change. 
“Mass Society Thesis” and “Community Integration'' focus on the weakened 
effect of institutional affiliations and community on political behavior in advanced 
industrialism. Instead of the traditional interaction of people, mass media takes effect 
away from face-to-face contacts. The resulting mass society or integrated community 
are much more homogeneous and independent from the influence of conventional 
organizations. “[A] traditional political style based on primary networks such as 
family, the village, the union, or the local church has become less relevant as these 
ties have eroded" (p. 17). 
“Cognitive Mobilization” thesis argues that voters have been more sophisticated 
and well informed. They act according to their own calculation on issues and 
candidates, and independent from traditional party ties. “Aging Party System'' thesis 
perceives party systems as "life-cycle". Party systems would grow in age, as "the 
issues that initially structured party conflict may lose relevance over time" (p. 19). 
''Value Change” thesis concerns on value change brought about by the "tremendous 
postwar change in personal and societal conditions" (p.20), that is from materialist to 
postmaterialist values which has been discussed before. (For details of different 
models, see Dalton et.al. 1985:15-20). 
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The experiences of electoral change in western democracies offer us two hints 
about electoral change. First, electoral change happens due to the change of the 
cleavage system. Old cleavages decline and new cleavages take place. When the old 
cleavages collapse, the electorate of a society changes from a stable alignment to a 
dealignment pattern. When the new cleavages take over the effect of the old cleavages, 
the electorate transforms from the dealignment to a realignment pattern. 
Second, the fundamental source of electoral change is societal change. The 
above various explanatory models have one similarity: the starting point is the 
advanced or post industrialization in the postwar era. The decline of the working and 
agrarian class, as well as the rise of the middle class is a change of social structure. 
The rising importance of mass media with the diminishing role of social networks is a 
new paradigm of human relationships. These societal changes makes the mass became 
more sophisticated and postmaterialistic. Consequently, the mass reason differently 
and hence vote differently. Changes do not happen in a vacuum. Electoral change is 
the result of societal changes. 
Factors of Voting Behavior 
In this part, major studies of voting behavior will be reviewed. What factors are 
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important in explaining voting behavior? Voting behavior points to two things: voter 
turnout and voter choice. The former is about a person to vote or not, while the latter 
is about how a person votes. In explaining these two actions, three main sets of factors 
are commonly adopted by many scholars of voting behavior. They are sociological 
factors, social-psychological factors and rational choice factors. (Niemi et al. 
1993a:8-10; Tillie 1995:16-26; Popkin 1991:9-17) 
Sociological Factors 
Sociological factors explain voter behavior by voters' social ties. Social ties can 
be organizational or non-organizational. Church, trade union and political party are 
examples of organizational social ties. Non-organizational social ties are, for example, 
age, sex, race, class and education. Owing to the social ties of voters, they vote on 
candidates or political parties that are most likely to represent their interests. 
The first study of sociological explanations originated in the United States. 
Based on aggregate data, the study explains party support by geographic and social 
factors (Tingsten 1937). In later studies, Lazarsfeld and his colleagues of the 
Columbia School (Lazarsfeld et al. 1944; Berelson et al. 1954) used repeated surveys 
of a panel of voters to study the effect of campaign on voter choice. Conversely, the 
conclusion of the study is not in line with the hypothesis, that local campaigns had a 
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minimal effect on the voter behaviour: 
Most of those who eventually voted Republican had been that way all along 
without any change during the campaign... It follows that the time of final 
decision, that point after which the voter does not change his intention, occurred 
prior to the campaign for most voters --- and thus no 'real decision' was made in 
the campaign in the sense of waiting to consider alternatives. (Berelson et al. 
1954:242) 
Such finding shows that voter choice was shaped much earlier before campaign 
activities. Instead, long-term characteristics of voters, especially social-structural 
attributes such as social and economic status, religion, education and so forth, are 
much more influential. It finds that the working class, blacks and Catholics are more 
willing to vote the Democratic Party. In contrast, middle and upper classes, whites and 
Protestants tend to support the Republican Party. The sociological factors are essential 
outside the United States, too. In European democracies, religion and social class are 
the most influential factors in determining voter choice as mentioned (Lipset and 
Rokkan 1967). Although the effect of sociological factors declines in the dealignment 
process, they are still good starting points to explain voting behavior. 
Social-Psychological Factors 
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Social-psychological factors explain voting behavior by voters' attitudes. 
Contrast to sociological factors which study external social ties of voters, 
social-psychological factors focus on internal cognition of voters. Voters are driven by 
feelings and affections towards certain candidate or political party which eventually 
determines the voting behavior. 
The classical The American Voter (Campbell et al. 1960) is the first study 
constructing a complete social-psychological model. As it states, 
Our hypothesis is that the partisan choice the individual voter makes depends in 
an immediate sense on the strength and direction of the elements comprising a 
field of psychological forces, where these elements are interpreted as attitudes 
toward the perceived objects of national politics, (p.9) 
Party identification, perception toward political parties and candidates, and policy 
issue preferences are the three main attitudinal factors discussed in the book. Party 
identification is the voter's psychological support of a certain political party in a long 
run. The identification is shaped in a long period of time and often inherited from 
parents. Perception toward political parties and candidates is the immediate image of 
voters derived from their behaviors, speeches and even appearances. Policy issue 
preference is attitudes of voters on different political or non-political issues. 
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The recent development of cognitive psychology makes the social-psychological 
approach more sophisticated: 
Cognitive psychology's findings about meaning and information usage go 
beyond cues and information shortcuts to describe modes of reasoning, 
processing aids, all of which can be applied to the analysis of reasoning voters' 
decisions. (Popkin 1991:15) 
In his The Reasoning Voter, Popkin stresses information shortcuts and weighted 
combination of different information by voters to make their electoral choices. 
(1991:16-7) Instead of receiving all information at the same rate and using 
information with the same weight, voters utilize their "default values" to receive and 
use information. The old attitudes and beliefs of voters fills up their incomplete 
pictures composed by ill-received information. Therefore, voter behavior is not just 
determined by the attitudes at the time of voting, but is also shaped by old attitudes 
mined in the voter. 
Sniderman, Glaser and Griffin (1991) study the 'cognitive ability' factor, too. 
They demonstrate that voters with different cognitive abilities in gathering political 
information would have different ways to come up with their electoral choices. The 
voter with a lower cognitive ability relies more on the incumbent approval and 
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evaluation of national economy. On the other hand, the one with a higher cognitive 
ability inclines to candidate competence and policy preferences. As a result, although 
attitudes are important in determining voting behavior, the effects are different for 
voters with different cognitive ability. 
Rational-Choice Factors 
If voters are rational and utility maximizer, they will vote for the candidate or 
party which maximizes their benefits and minimizes their costs. Voters use 
dimensions such as ideology, issue-position and past performance evaluation to 
calculate cost and benefit (Tillie 1995:22). 
The "Left-Right" or "Liberal-Conservative" ideological dimension has existed in 
western democracies for a long time. In his classics An Economic Theory of 
Democracy, Anthony Downs (1957) uses it to demonstrate the behavior of voters and 
political parties. Voters position themselves and political parties in the spectrum. They 
choose the political party which is the closest to their own positions. Besides the 
"Left-Right" or "Liberal-Conservative" dimension, there are other ideological 
dimensions like the materialistic/ post-materialistic value cleavage proposed by 
Inglehart (1977; 1985 and 1997). 
Issue position is another rational dimension. Unlike ideology, which represents a 
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set of values and orientations, issue means particular and specific subject matters. 
Economic voting is one of the common issue variables in explaining voting behavior. 
Some studies show that voter choice is shaped by voter's financial status or the social 
economic situation (Lewis-Beck 1988; and Norpoth et.al. 1991). Aside from 
economic issue, foreign policy issue is significant in issue voting study especially in 
the United States (Aldrich, Sullivan and Borgida 1993). Salience issue differs in 
different societies. For example, Kohei, Miyake and Watanuki (1991) identify four 
main issue areas in Japan, namely money politics issues, economic issues, cultural 
politics issues, and foreign relations with Communist neighbors. 
Evaluation of the party performances is a noteworthy factor too (Fiorina 1981). 
Ideology and issue voting only deal with the relative positions of voters and political 
parties, but evaluation of past party performances is concerned about whether a party 
has carried out its promises according to their ideological and issue positions. Such 
perspective is called retrospective voting. On the contrary, prospective voting focuses 
on the expectation of voters towards party performances (Lewis-Beck 1988). 
After the review, we have a first glimpse on the factors affecting voting behavior. 
However, not all factors discussed above will be explored in this study. Not all factors 
have equal significance in Hong Kong because of its distinctive context. In the next 
section, literature on Hong Kong voting behavior will be reviewed in order to figure 
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out the appropriate factors in the special circumstances of Hong Kong. 
Voting Behavior Studies in Hong Kong 
This section will be divided into two parts. The first part is voter turnout, while 
the second part is voter choice. 
Voter Turnout 
In the first direct election of Legislative Council in Hong Kong, Louie (1993b) 
finds that the socio-economic characteristics of Hong Kong voters are similar to 
western countries. "[EJducational attainment, income and occupation, prove to be the 
most important factors affecting the turnout rate of electors." (p.30) People of higher 
education, higher income and occupation of administrative and professional style are 
more likely to vote. "Among the three [variables], educational attainment plays a 
particularly significant role." (p.30) 
For the election in 1995, Shum (1996) did a more comprehensive study on voter 
turnout. Besides socio-economic factors, he also explores the effect of political 
attitudes and campaign exposure. The findings of socio-economic factors are more or 
less the same as Louie (1993b). Still, education, income and occupation have 
significant effects. Age has effect too. Yet, its relationship with voter turnout is 
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curvilinear: older people are more likely to vote, but the effect is just opposite after 
the age of 66. Indeed, Shum finds that education is not directly correlated with voter 
turnout, but it exerts effect through the association with political attitudes. People who 
have higher sense of civic duty, political efficacy and interest in politics are more 
likely to vote; and all these political attitudes are positively related with educational 
attainment. The study also demonstrates that campaign exposure, has independent 
effect on voter turnout, but its effect is less significant than that of political attitudes. 
Voter Choice 
The studies of voter choice in Hong Kong can be classified into three main 
groups according to the categorization of factors in the previous section: sociological 
factors, social-psychological factors and rational choice factors. 
Sociological Factors: In Hong Kong 1991 election, Tsang (1993) analyzes the 
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of supporters of the democrats. It 
finds that the public housing residents, people with relatively well education, high 
occupational status, high income, and young employees are more likely to support 
democrats. Moreover, Li (1993) explores the rural-urban cleavage in explaining voter 
choice of the same election. He shows that the larger proportion of rural residents 
lived in a constituency, the more votes the conservative forces would receive. 
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Social-Psychological Factors: There are several studies of party identification in 
Hong Kong. (Louie 1993c, 1996; Sun 1999) In 1991 and 1995 elections, Louie 
(1993c; 1996) investigates the existence of party identification in Hong Kong. 
However, his operationalization of party identification is very different from the 
conventional usage of the term. He uses voter's actual vote choice and his/her 
awareness of the party affiliation of the candidate to indicate his/her party 
identification. (1993c:169-70; 1996:147-8) In his latter study, he adds the criteria 
"willing to vote for a candidate who will be fielded by this same party in the next 
election". (1996:147) Nevertheless, the party identification of such measurement 
cannot be taken as an explanatory variable of voter choice. Otherwise, tautology 
arises. The contribution of his studies is that quite a small portion of voters is aware of 
the party affiliation of the candidates. 
Sun's (1999) operationalization of party identification is much closer to the usual 
meaning of the concept. He asks the respondents "which party do you support?" to 
indicate their party identification, and "the degree of support for the party" to indicate 
their strength of partisanship, (p. 136) He finds that the strength of partisanship is 
significantly associated with the party voting. On the other hand, the strength of 
partisanship is influenced by the assessment of a party's past performance, (p. 148-9) 
The findings propose that party identification was an important factor of voter choice 
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in 1998 election. 
However, we should be cautious about such conclusion. Since the survey was 
conducted soon after the election, and respondents were asked about their support of a 
certain party together with their vote choice, it is reasonable to argue that the 
respondents were difficult to distinguish the two questions. If the suspicion is correct, 
the strong relationship between the strength of partisanship and the vote choice is not 
surprising. 
Why is it so difficult to apply party identification as an explanatory variable of 
vote choice in Hong Kong? Since political parties have emerged in Hong Kong for a 
decade only, it is unreasonable to assume any long term and deep psychological 
involvement towards political parties of the mass. In western countries, party 
identification is a matter for generations. Parents and children often have 
identification of the same party. If comparable study has to be conducted in Hong 
Kong, we have to employ a method that the long term and relatively stable 
psychological affiliation of political parties can be assessed. Otherwise, party 
identification is not a meaningful explanatory factor of voter choice, at least at this 
stage, in Hong Kong. 
Besides party identification, Leung (1993; 1996) concludes a psychological 
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factor called "anti-Communist China syndrome/sentiment" to explain voter choice in 
Hong Kong for 1991 and 1995 elections. It is a long term attitude, because it is the 
result of the long separation between Hong Kong and the Mainland China. It is also a 
short term attitude, because it is closely related to the June accident in 1989. The 
syndrome/sentiment is quite successful in explaining the voter choice that voters with 
the syndrome/sentiment are more likely to vote for the democrats, while voters 
without the syndrome tend to support pro-China candidates. However, the Kowloon 
Northeast constituency was an exceptional case in 1995. In that constituency, Mak 
Hoi Wah of DP and Chan Yuen Han of DAB were in contest. Voter choice in this 
constituency was unrelated with the syndrome/sentiment. The factor of candidate 
image was proposed to explain such exception, since Chan was much more popular 
than Mak. However, the independent effect of candidate image has not been studied in 
Hong Kong up to now. 
Rational Choice Factors: Some scholars explain voter choice in Hong Kong by 
rational choice factors. Li (1996) introduces two dimensions to position voters and 
political parties. They were the "center-periphery" and "collective-individual 
consumption" dimensions. However, voter choice is found not allied with voter 
position on the dimensions so well. There are two possibilities of such mismatching. 
The first is that it is the author who states positions of political parties, instead of the 
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respondents. Voter perception on political parties may be different from that of the 
author. The second possibility is the non-existence of the two dimensions in Hong 
Kong. 
Wong (1999) analyzes issue voting in Hong Kong. He takes a step forward than 
Li (1996), because he asks the respondents to report their perceived position of 
political parties, rather than by his own. Issues of class, economy and stability are 
proved to be significant. Still, most respondents have difficulty to locate the issue 
positions of most political parties, except DP and DAB. Although issue factors have a 
significant effect on voter choice in Hong Kong; the effect is confined to the two big 
parties. 
Generally, studies of Hong Kong voting behavior yields the following findings. 
First, like western democracies, sociological factors matter, especially for age, 
education, income and occupation. Second, with reference to social-psychological 
factors, party identification is not a proper explanatory variable in Hong Kong current 
situation. However, attitudes relating China like "anti-Communist China syndrome/ 
sentiment" (Leung 1993 and 1996) and "national attitude" issue (Wong 1999) have a 
significant effect on voter choice. Although the way to operationalize the attitudes 
toward China may differ in different years, the effect should not be understated. 
Fourth, Hong Kong voters are still not so sophisticated to distinguish the political 
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parties in terms of specific issue positions. Rational choice factors, if matter, are 
confined to broad orientations or attitudes. 
In the next chapter, based on the hints obtained above, I will try to explain the 
electoral decline of DP. A theoretical framework and hypotheses will be introduced. 
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Chapter Four 
Explaining The Decline: A Speculation 
Based on the hints in the last chapter, a possible explanation of the electoral decline of 
DP will be given in this chapter. The whole idea of the speculation can be represented 
by figure 4.1. It starts with three major contextual changes in Hong Kong in the 1990s. 
They are partial democratization, sovereignty change and governing crises. These 
contextual changes led to changes in political attitudes of the mass, including trust in 
Beijing，attitudes toward democracy and trust in SAR government. Change in their 
political attitudes in turn leads to change in voting behavior. This framework is 
proposed to explain the electoral decline of DP. 
Figure 4.1 Theoretical Framework of Electoral Change in Hong Kong 
Contextual ~ . ^ . “ Changes Changes in Political Attitudes 
Partial “ ； ； 
PemocTatization Trust in Beijing 
Sovereignty Attitude towards J C h a n g e in  
Change Democracy ^Voting Behavior 
Governing Crises Trust in the SAR  Government  
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Contextual Change in Hong Kong 
Three major changes in Hong Kong are identified here. They are partial 
democratization, change of sovereignty and governing crises. These three changes are 
inter-related, but in order to give a simpler picture, I try to discuss them separately. 
Partial Democratization 
The most distinctive characteristic of democratization in Hong Kong is its partial 
nature (Lau and Kuan 2000). After the Sino-British Joint Declaration was signed in 
1984，democratization in Hong Kong started. However, there was no touch on the 
direct election of the governor of the colony or the chief executive of the SAR. 
Democratization only concentrated in the introduction of elected seats of the 
legislature which is still incomplete. In 1985, 12 seats of functional constituencies and 
12 seats of election committee were introduced. This was the first time of elected 
seats in Hong Kong's legislature，though the franchise was limited to businessmen 
and professionals. In 1991, there were 18 directly elected seats of geographical 
constituencies. In 1995，directly elected seats increased to 20 and all appointed seats 
were abolished. According to the political reform introduced by the last governor 
Chris Patten, the 30 seats of functional constituencies expanded the franchise to all 
working populations. The China side seriously accused the reform, because it 
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contradicted the original idea of functional constituencies to "reserve" seats for 
businessmen and professionals. To react, China set up the provisional legislature and 
discarded the "through-train" arrangement for the colonial legislature. This delayed 
the timetable of democratization scheduled in the Basic Law. In 1998, instead of 1997， 
the first legislature of HKSAR was set up. It consisted of 20 directly elected seats 
returned by geographical constituencies, 30 indirectly elected seats of functional 
constituencies and 10 seats of the election committee. In 2000，the number of directly 
elected seats further increased to 24 and that of the election committee reduced to 6. 
The Basic Law stipulates that there will be 30 directly elected seats and no seat of the 
election committee in 2004. The further political development in Hong Kong will be 
evaluated in 2007. 
Over a decade, Hong Kong has not yet been fully democratized. The partial 
democracy brought about essential but partial consequences. At the elite level, it 
provides the chances of birth of political parties, but the development is seriously 
constrained (Louie 1992; Lau and Kuan 2000). On the other hand, it enhances the role 
of supervision of the legislature (Miners 1994). However, the resulting 
confrontational executive-legislative relationship became a deadlock. At the mass 
level, it increases the opportunities of electoral participation. Yet, the political 
alienation and political inefFicacy of Hong Kong people boosted (Lau 1998). 
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Sovereignty Change 
After the transition over a decade, Hong Kong ended its history as a colony of 
Britain in 1997. Contrast to most decolonization histories, Hong Kong did not become 
an independent polity, but was returned to China. Meanwhile, Hong Kong did not 
become a normal local government, but is granted the status of a Special 
Administrative Region with a high degree of autonomy. "One Country, Two Systems" 
is applied in Hong Kong. There are also two important structural features after the 
sovereignty change. One is the new relationship with the sovereign country and the 
other one is the new role of Hong Kong government. 
Many constitutional provisions demonstrate that China and Hong Kong have 
established a new hierarchical relationship after the sovereignty change. According to 
the Basic Law, Hong Kong is "an alienable part of the People's Republic of China" 
after 1997 (Art. 1). The power of HKSAR is "authorized" by the National People's 
Congress (Art. 2). Although the SAR government enjoys a high degree of autonomy, 
it "come[s] directly under the Central People's Government" (Art. 12). The Chief 
Executive is accountable to the central government (Art. 43). The Standing 
Committee of the National People's Congress (SCNPC) may return the laws enacted 
by the legislature in question which is considered not in conformity with the Basic 
Law (Art. 17). In addition, The SCNPC is vested with the power of interpretation and 
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amendment of the Basic Law (Art. 158). 
Rules on paper may not be applied in reality. However, the behaviors of the SAR 
government also indicate there is an emergence of a new hierarchical relationship 
between the HKSAR and the central government. The case of re-interpretation of the 
Basic Law by the SCNPC concerning about the right of abode in 1999 is the best to 
illustrate the central-local hierarchy in legislative and judiciary aspects. In the aspect 
of social control, the SAR government tightened its control over political 
organizations and dissidents which are considered unwelcome by the central 
government, for example, Fa Lun Gong, a religious organization made illegal in 
China, and democratic activists. 
Paradoxically, the SAR government enjoys a higher autonomy after 1997 than in 
the colonial period. The central government, at least constitutionally, is the sovereign 
power of the HKSAR, but it does not involve in most of the ruling matter of the 
region. In the colonial period, the British government directly appointed the governor, 
who must be a British. So that it could directly rule Hong Kong. After the handover, 
the CE of HKSAR must be a permanent resident in Hong Kong (Art. 44) and is 
elected by an election committee instead of direct appointed by the central 
government. Yet, the CE has all political and executive powers over Hong Kong as 
former governors, except military and diplomacy power. High ranked officials of the 
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SAR government change their roles too. In colonial period, they implemented policies 
initiated by the governors. After the handover, since the CE Tung Chee Hwa is an 
inexperienced politician and unfamiliar with the operations of the government, he 
needs a greater participation of the bureaucrats in policy making. The failure of 
Tung's idea of building 85,000 residential flats per year, which lacks the support from 
bureaucrats, is the best example to show the rising role of bureaucracy in governing 
Hong Kong. In short, after the sovereignty change, the SAR government has a more 
independent role in ruling Hong Kong 
Governing Crises 
The third major societal change in Hong Kong is the governing crises after 1997. 
There are two major aspects of crises: economic crisis and policy failures. 
The economic success of Hong Kong has been called a miracle. Hong Kong was 
one of the "four little Asian dragons" together with Singapore, South Korea and 
Taiwan because of their economic triumphs. In 1970s，Hong Kong's GDP growth was 
90/0 per year in average. In 1980s，the rate was about 7%. Before 1997，the rate was 
still remained at about 5%. However, after 1997，because of the Asian financial crisis, 
the GDP growth rate dropped suddenly to -5.1% in 1998，and -3.1% in the first 
quarter of 1999. Unemployment rate was up to about 5%. (Figures are quoted from 
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Lee 1999: 945-6) The Hong Kong people have not experienced such an economic 
downturn before. 
Secondly, the SAR government does not perform satisfactorily as the colonial 
government did. In the colonial period, the bureaucracy of Hong Kong was regarded 
as highly efficient. (Yu 1997:242) Unfortunately, this reputation was tore down by the 
SAR government after 1997. There are many examples of policy failures or crises, e.g. 
the bird-flu in the end of 1997, new airport fiasco in mid 1998，the non-confidence 
vote against the Secretary for Justice Elsie Leung, the request of SAR government to 
the Standing Committee of National People's Congress to reinterpret the Court of 
Final Appeal's ruling on the right of abode of mainland offspring of Hong Kong 
permanent residents in 1999，the housing scandal in 2000 and so forth. 
Political Attitudes 
The intermediate factors between contextual changes and electoral changes is 
political attitudes. But before talking about the content and changes of political 
attitudes, let us first discuss why the study focuses on political attitudes. Hinted by the 
last chapter, there are many factors explaining voting behavior, so what is (are) the 
reason(s) for only studying political attitudes? 
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In the first place, exploring the relationship between political attitudes and 
electoral change does not exclude the effects of other factors, but it is beyond the 
scope of this study to provide a full explanation of the electoral decline of DP. For 
example, as shown in the competition between Chan Yuen Han and Mak Hoi Wah in 
the 1995 election, candidate image has certain effect on voter choice，(See p.45 of this 
dissertation). However, no related question has been included in the survey. This 
makes it difficult to study its effect directly. The effect can be hypothesized, but 
cannot be proved. Factors of this kind are excluded in this study. It may leave to other 
studies to investigate their effects. 
Second, factors which are speculated with no significance in the context of Hong 
Kong are excluded. For example, partisanship is a significant factor of voting 
behavior in western democracies, but it is not appropriate for Hong Kong (See p.43-4 
of this dissertation). Issue voting is inappropriate too, since Hong Kong voters are not 
yet sophisticated enough to distinguish issue positions of all political parties (Wong 
1999). Performance evaluation of political parties is again unsuitable. In Hong Kong, 
contrasting with most democratic countries, political parties cannot be the government 
party. Therefore, performances of political parties are not equivalent to the 
government performance. The functions of political parties are limited in monitoring 
(sometimes merely discussing) governmental policies only, so it is difficult for a voter 
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to evaluate the actual performance political parties. Meanwhile, sociological factors 
are hypothesized to have no effect on the electoral decline of DP. As the electoral 
decline of DP happened just within a decade, especially between 1998 and 2000, so 
there should not be significant change of sociological factors like age or education in 
such a short period of time. Yet, the sociological factors are too common to be 
included in behavioral study, so they will be included as well. 
Third, political attitudes have their own value to study. Trust in Beijing, attitudes 
to democracy and trust in SAR government are all important dimensions to know 
about the mass of Hong Kong. If we believe that attitudes shape behavior, changes in 
political attitudes certainly bring about changes in political behaviors. Therefore, 
studies of political attitudes have significant implications for the political future in 
Hong Kong. 
Three political attitudes will be studied: trust in Beijing, attitude to democracy, 
and trust in SAR government. Originally, they are proposed by Lau and Kuan (2000). 
In their study, "Partial Democratization, 'Foundation Moments' and Political Parties 
in Hong Kong", three political cleavages are found to divide political parties and 
public.3 
3 In their study, pace of democratization was proposed instead of attitude towards democracy. This 
modification would be discussed later in the chapter. 
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Trust in Beijing 
According to Lau and Kuan, the cleavage of trust in Beijing has its own 
historical root. As many Hong Kong people were refugees from political persecution 
in China, and together with the 1989 Tiananmen Square Incident, "[p]ublic trust that 
Beijing would fulfill its promise to allow the Hong Kong people to rule themselves 
autonomously was low." After the sovereignty change, this fear was more 
understandable, as the protective shelter provided by Britain was gone. (p.715) 
The cleavage of trust in Beijing is similar to the dimensions recommended by 
other scholars. They include the "Anti-Communist China Syndrome/ Sentiment" of 
Leung (1993; 1996); "Center-Periphery" dimension of Li (1996), and "National 
Attitude" issue of Wong (1999). Although the content and measurement of these 
concepts are quite different, they all refer to attitude of Hong Kong people towards 
Beijing. 
The trust in Beijing is closely related to the Tiananmen Square Incident. In 1989, 
over a million people protested in the street. They shouted to overthrow the 
government of Deng Shaoping, Li Peng and Yang Shangkun. As time passes by, the 
influence of the incident declined. The decreasing number of participants in the June 
4th Candle Night Vigil can show the declining influence (Table 4.1). Clearly, both 
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numbers of participants estimated by the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic 
Democratic Movements of China (HKASPDM) and the Hong Kong Police Force 
show the drop. 
Table 4.1 Number of participants in June Candle Night Vigil 1991-2000 
Year Number estimated by HKASPDM Number estimated by the Police Force 
1991 100,000 60,000 
1993 40,000 12,000 
1995 35,000 16,000 
1997 55,000 — 
1999 70,000 — 
200 0 45,000 — • 
Source: Apple Daily 5/6/2000 
Figure 4.2 Satisfaction and Dissatisfaction with the Performance of the PRC 
Government in Dealing with Hong Kong Affairs 1993-2000 
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Source: Hong Kong Transition Project (Sep 2000), p.26 
On the other hand, the central government has not intervened in the Hong Kong 
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domestic matters too much after the sovereignty change. This results in a general 
increase of the trust in Beijing among Hong Kong people (Figure 4.2). Hong Kong 
people have become more satisfied with the performance of the PRC government in 
handling with Hong Kong affairs. We can see that the percentage of satisfied is much 
lower than that of dissatisfied before 1997. The positions of the two interchange after 
the sovereignty has changed. 
Attitude toward Democracy 
The second cleavage proposed by Lau and Kuan is the pace of democratization. 
It emerged as Britain initiated democratic reform in Hong Kong. It overlaps with the 
cleavage of trust in Beijing. (Lau and Kuan 2000:715) This cleavage is similar to the 
"Stability" issue of Wong (1999). 
I investigate the attitude towards democracy instead of pace of democratization 
only. Attitude towards democracy is a broader concept. It includes a person's support 
of democracy in general. He/she may support democracy, but does not know the 
meaning of democracy. He/she may support democracy or even to form government 
through direct election, but does not agree to have democracy immediately. 
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Table 4.2 Change of attitude towards democracy due to crises, 2000 
Statement Weaker belief No influence Stronger belief 
than before than before 
A directly elected CE is 11.1 34.9 39.7 
more able to resolve 
different crises 
Democracy is the best 6.6 35.8 43.7 
political institution 
Hong Kong should speed 4.3 32.3 50.7 
up democratic reform  
Note: Entries are in percentage. The sum is not equal to 100% due to exclusion of don't know and 
don't answer. 
Source: Public Affairs Survey 2000 
There is no longitudinal data of attitude towards democracy to compare. 
However, in PAS 2000, a majority reported that they have changed in attitude towards 
democracy in different aspects due to experiences with certain crises (Table 4.2). 
Respondents were required to report the influences of crises on their belief in different 
aspects of democracy. The questions include "a directly elected CE is able to resolve 
different crises", "democracy is the best political institution", and "Hong Kong should 
speed up democratic reform". About two-third of the respondents admit they have 
changed in the three statements. More people have stronger belief towards democracy 
than before. There is another evidence to show the change of attitude towards 
democracy of Hong Kong people in recent years. Comparing the two Public Affair 
Survey in 1998 and 2000 respectively, the dissatisfaction with the functioning of 
democratic politics has increased. In 1998，32.0% dissatisfied with the functioning of 
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democratic politics in Hong Kong, compared to 47.6% of satisfied. In 2000, the 
percentage of dissatisfied increased to 41.3%, while that of satisfied dropped to 32.7%. 
This shows that Hong Kong people really have experienced a change of view on 
democracy. 
Trust in Hong Kong Government 
The third cleavage is the trust in Hong Kong government. "This cleavage is 
caused by Hong Kong's executive-led political system wherein the executive is not 
popularly elected and is checked and balanced by a weak legislature." (Lau and Kuan 
2000:714) After 1997，as the SAR government has became more autonomous in 
governing, but at the same time with more policy failures, this cleavage is more 
significant. 
Figure 4.3 shows the satisfaction and dissatisfaction with the performance of the 
Hong Kong government and the CE between 1993 and 2000. In 1993 Feburary, the 
percentages of satisfied and dissatisfied with the Hong Kong government are 60% and 
31o/o respectively. However, the percentages of the two reversed in 2000 August, with 
30% satisfied and 61% dissatisfied. The lines of the CE run in the similar way. Just 
before the handover, in 1997 February, there were 53% satisfied and only 24% 
dissatisfied. The percentage of satisfied dropped to 32% while that of dissatisfied rose 
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to 56%. 
Figure 4.3 Satisfaction and Dissatisfaction with the performance of the Hong 
Kong government and the CE 
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Source: Hong Kong Transition Project (2000 Sep), pp. 18 and 22. 
The disappointing performance of the SAR government and the CE constitutes a 
loss of the trust in the SAR government compared to the colonial government. In 
1985，the trust in the Hong Kong government was high, with 72.1% trust against 
16.8% distrust (Lau and Kuan 1995:84). After the handover, the percentage of trust 
decreased to 52.7%, while that of distrust rose to 32.9% (PAS 1998). 
Positions of Political Parties 
Based on the work of Lau and Kuan (2000) and together with other studies 
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(Wong 1999)，the positions of different political parties on the three political attitudes 
are summarized in figure 4.4. In the spectrum, the three political attitudes mentioned 
above overlap each other. On the right hand side, political parties are more likely to 
trust Beijing, anti-democracy and trust the SAR government. On the left hand side, 
political parties are more likely to mistrust Beijing, support democracy and mistrust 
the SAR government. 
Figure 4.4 Positions of Political Parties on Three Political Attitudes 
Political Attitudes  
Mistrust Beijing Trust Beijing 
Pro-Democracy Anti-Democracy 
Mistrust the SAR Government Trust the SAR Government 
DP TF LP DAB 
It should be cautious that the positions of political parties are subjectively 
perceived by voters, but not on the basis of the behaviors or platforms of political 
parties. For example, DAB, even as a popular party, is perceived as more conservative 
than LP along the democracy dimension. In the legislature, DAB sometimes vote 
against the SAR government in economic and livelihood issues, but people still 
perceive it as a party allied with the SAR government to a large extent. (Lau and 
Kuan 2000:715). I therefore place DAB at the "trust Beijing" and "Anti-Democracy" 
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side，on the right of LP. TF is on the right of DP, yet it should be more likely to 
mistrust Beijing, support democracy and mistrust the SAR government by the 
performance of the party (Ma and Choy 1999:91). However, perceived by the voters, 
the positions of TF and DP have to be altered (Wong 1999:114-5). 
Hypothesis 
It has been demonstrated that Hong Kong has experienced partial 
democratization, sovereignty change and governing crises. In these contexts, the 
major political attitudes of the Hong Kong people: trust in Beijing, attitude towards 
democracy and trust in the SAR government, have changed too. On the other hand, 
DP, the largest political party in Hong Kong, is declining. Does the electoral decline 
of DP relate to the changes of political attitudes? If yes, in what way does it happen? 
If the electoral decline of DP is really related to the changes of the three main 
political attitudes, the electoral change of original DP voters must be related to their 
positions of the political attitudes. And according to the relative positions of political 
parties suggested in figure 4.4, voters who dislike democracy and put more trust in 
both Beijing and the HKSAR government are more likely to leave DP. Is this 
hypothesis true? It will be tested in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Five 
Explaining The Decline: Testing The Hypothesis 
This chapter tests the hypothesis proposed in the previous chapter. Regression 
analysis will be applied to study the impact of political attitudes (independent 
variables) on the change of voting behavior of DP voters (dependent variable). 
Bivariate analysis will be done first. It is followed by multivariate analysis. 
Measurement of Variables 
Dependent Variable(s) 
The analysis in this chapter is based on the data of PAS 2000. I am trying to 
explain why voters who supported DP in 1998，leave it in 2000. The dependent 
variable is defined as a dichotomy: DP Consistent Voters (coded as 0 and DPCV in 
short) or DP Leaving Voters (coded as 1 and DPLV in short). DPCV are those who 
voted for DP in the both elections of 1998 and 2000. DPLV are those who voted for 
DP in 1998，but not voted for it in 2000. By this operationalization, the number of 
respondents included is 259 which is the number of DP voters in 1998. Among the 
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259 cases, there are 127 DPCV and 132 DPLV.4 
The so-defined dependent variable only contrasts DP consistent voters and DP 
leaving voters, so it assumes that DPLV is a group of people shared with common 
characteristics. However, we have already known that, leaving voters can be 
distinguished into two groups that are those who have switched choices and those 
who have abstained. These two groups of respondents may leave DP due to different 
reasons. Therefore, I introduce two other sets of dependent variables. The first one is 
between DPCV (coded as 0) and DP Leaving Voters by Switched Choices (coded as 1 
and DPLS). And the second one is between DPCV (coded as 0) and DP Leaving 
Voters by Abstention (coded as 1 and DPLA in short). 
Independent Variables 
Political attitude is the major target in this study. It includes Trust in Beijing, 
Attitudes to Democracy and Trust in the SAR Government. (For easy reading, all 
independent variables will be italic in the following.) 
For Trust in Beijing, PAS 2000 does not have any item directly tackling it. I use 
another question to measure respondents' trust in Beijing. The question is "Do you 
agree: the SAR government does not necessarily have to follow the Central 
4 The total number of respondents in the flill dataset is 1806. 
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government?" The answer is a four-point scale: strongly disagree (coded as 1)， 
disagree (2), agree (3) or strongly agree (4). It is reasonable to assume that one with 
higher trust in Beijing is more likely to disagree with the statement. So a lower score 
means a higher trust in Beijing, while a higher score means a lower trust (or higher 
mistrust) in Beijing. Therefore, the variable will be termed mistrust in Beijing for easy 
reading. 
Attitude toward Democracy is a broader concept. There are several levels of the 
understanding. The first one is the general commitment to democracy, whether 
supporting it or not. I use the most common indicator in comparative politics to 
measure this kind of attitude. Respondents are invited to choose one of the three 
following statements that he/she mostly agrees with: 
(1) Compared to many other types of government, a democratic one is always the best; 
(2) Under certain circumstances, an authoritarian government is better than a democratic one; 
(3) For me, it is no matter whether a government democratic or not. 
I recode the answers into dichotomous form: supporters of democracy (coded as 1) or 
non-supporters of democracy (2). Respondents of the first statement are classified as 
supporters of democracy, while those of the second or the third statement, "don't 
know，，or "no comment" and "refuse to answer" are put into the category of 
non-supporters of democracy. 
The general commitment to democracy reveals no understanding of the meaning 
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of democracy. Different people may have different perception of democracy. Someone 
may define democracy as consultative government instead of government by 
election! 5 Therefore, it is important to know the attitude to elections of respondents in 
order to identify their perceptions of democracy. Respondents are presented the 
following: 
Someone says, it would be better, to change the type of ruling in Hong Kong, instead of the 
current SAR government. Do you agree with the following statements? 
(1) Let the Chief Executive directly elected by people rule. 
(2) Let the Legislative Council directly elected by people rule. 
The fist statement measures the support of direct election ofCE, and the second one 
measures the support of direct election of legislature. Both direct elections of the CE 
and the legislature are included to see which one is a better indicator. Again, the 
answer is in the form of four-point scale. 
The third indicator of Attitude to Democracy is the faster pace of 
democratization. People who support democracy in general and the installation of 
direct election for the formation of government may not want them immediately. 
People can still differ in attitude towards the pace of democratization. However, PAS 
2000 does not ask about the pace of democratization. Then I resort to use a related 
question as indirect indicator. In the survey, respondents are asked to evaluate the 
5 Kuan and Lau (1997) reported that the proportions of respondents perceiving "a government that is 
willing to consult public opinion" as a democratic government were 43.9%, 44.2%, 39.5% and 40.9% 
in 1985，1988, 1990 and 1992，respectively. Those who regarded "a popularly elected government" as 
democratic made up only 23.2%, 14.9%, 27.9%, and 22.7%, respectively (p.7). 
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current situation of Hong Kong from total authoritarian (scoring 1) to total democratic 
(scoring 10). At the same time, they are requested to score on Hong Kong which they 
expect by the same method. The difference between the two scores is the gap between 
one's wish and the reality perceived. It is reasonable to assume that the greater the 
difference, the faster pace of democratization one would agree. An example follows. 
If he scores 5 on the current Hong Kong it means he is partially satisfied with the 
present situation. Since he wants a faster pace of democratization, so he expects for a 
higher level of democracy than status quo, and he scores 10 on Hong Kong he wishes. 
As a result, his score of pace of democratization is +5. If one scores 6 on the current 
Hong Kong, and 8 on Hong Kong on the basis of his/her wishes. The difference is +2. 
It means that he/she wants a slower pace of democratization. 
The three different indicators of Attitude to Democracy, general commitment to 
democracy, support of direct election (of both CE and legislature), and faster pace of 
democratization, will be analyzed to see which is the best explanatory variable in 
terms of attitude to democracy. 
Frankly speaking, the above indicators reflect the attitudes to democracy of 
respondents at the time of interview only. They do not tell whether the attitudes have 
undergone changes or inherited from the past. Luckily, a set of questions in PAS 2000 
ask about the change of the attitudes to democracy in recent years. Respondents are 
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asked whether the recent crises in Hong Kong, e.g. Asia Financial Crisis, the Bird Flu 
and the Housing Scandal, alter their views on the following statements: 
(1) Democracy is the best political institution. 
(2) A directly elected Chief Executive is more able to resolve crises. 
(3) The democratic reform in Hong Kong should be faster in pace. 
The first statement reflects the stronger belief in democracy due to crises. The second 
concerns about the stronger belief in direct election of CE due to crises. The third 
reflects the stronger belief in faster pace of democratization due to crises. They 
supplement our understanding about the change of attitudes of people to democracy in 
recent years. 
The last political attitude to examine is the Trust in SAR government. PAS 2000 
tackles it directly. Respondents are asked about their trust in governmental institutions. 
Focusing on the executive branch of the government, two indicators are chosen: trust 
in Chief Executive and trust in senior officials, to see any difference. 
Socio-economic variables are included in the study, since they are commonly 
used in behavioral studies. These variables include Sex (male=l, female=2); Age\ 
Education (primary or below=l, secondary=2, tertiary or above=3); Place of birth 
(outside Hong Kong=l, in Hong Kong=2); Length of residence', Religion (Protestant 




Table 5.1 summarizes the findings of bivariate binary logistic regression by the 
independent variables. The table has three columns, showing results of different 
dependent variables. The first column is the results of DPCV/ DPLV, the second is 
DPCV/ DPLS, and the third is DPCV/ DPLA. 
The table excludes the socio-economic variables, since their results are all 
insignificant. This shows the socio-economic variables do not have a direct effect on 
DP voters to stay or leave at all. 
Not all variables of political attitudes are significant. I discuss one by one in the 
following. Mistrust in Beijing is not significant in all three columns. This shows the 
variable does not have a direct effect on DP voters to stay or leave in general. More 
specifically, attitude towards Beijing does not make any difference on DP voters to 
stay or switch choice, or abstain either. But this is not true when multivariate analysis 
is done. The effect of mistrust in Beijing is much more complicated, and this will be 
discussed later. At this stage, let's suppose the variable has no effect at all. 
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Table 5.1 Bivariate Logistic Regression: Statistics Summary 
Independent Variables Dependent Variable  
DPCV(0)/DPLV(1) DPCV(O)/ DPLS( 1) DPCV(O)/ DPLA( 1) 
Mistrust in Beijing (1 strongly trust - 4 strongly mistrust) 
Coefficient .442 .376 .484 
Chi-square 2.997 1.579 2.405 
-2 Log Likelihood 355.957 260.917 230.000 
F} .008 .006 .010 
Number of cases 259 200 186 
General commitment to democracy (1-yes; 2-no) 
Coefficient .875*** 1.061*** .640 
Chi-square 10.926 11.849 3.586 
-2 Log Likelihood 348.028 250.648 228.819 
R2 .031 .047 .016 
Number of cases 259 200 186 
Support of direct election of CE (1 strongly disagree - 4 strongly agree) 
Coefficient -.804** -.878** -.695* 
Chi-square 9.620 8.218 4.620 
-2 Log Likelihood 349.334 254.278 227.785 
.028 .032 .020 
Number of cases 259 200 186 
Support of direct election of legislature (1 strongly disagree - 4 strongly agree) 
Coefficient -.228 -.353 -.042 
Chi-square 1.395 2.550 . .030 
-2 Log Likelihood 357.559 259.946 232.375 
R2 .004 .010 .000 
Number of cases 259 200 186 
Faster pace of democratization (-10 to +10) 
Coefficient -.111 -.118 -.102 
Chi-square 3.057 2.556 1.524 
-2 Log Likelihood 355.897 259.940 230.881 
R2 .009 .010 .007 
Number of cases 259 200 186 
Belief more in democracy due to crises (1 believe less - 3 believe more) 
Coefficient -.600** -.409 -.790** 
Chi-square 7.895 2.531 9.481 
-2 Log Likelihood 351.059 259.966 222.924 
R2 .022 .010 .043 
Number of cases 259 200 186 
Believe more in direct elected CE due to crises (1 believe less - 3 believe more) 
Coefficient -.331 -.232 -.411 
Chi-square 3.302 1.215 3.465 
-2 Log Likelihood 355.651 261.281 228.940 
R2 .009 .005 .015 
Number of cases 259 200 186 
Believe more in faster pace of democratization due to crises (1 believe less - 3 believe more) 
Coefficient -.143 .020 -.322 
Chi-square .383 .005 1.306 
-2 Log Likelihood 358.571 262.491 231.099 
R2 .001 .000 .006 
Number of cases 259 200 186 
Trust in CE (1 strongly trust - 4 strongly mistrust) 
Coefficient .289 .483** .048 
Chi-square 3.890 7.719 .067 
-2 Log Likelihood 355.064 254.778 232.337 
R2 .011 .030 .003 
Number of cases 259 200 186 
Trust in high-ranked officials (1 strongly trust - 4 strongly mistrust) 
Coefficient .010 .162 -.192 
Chi-square .004 .843 .960 
-2 Log Likelihood 358.949 261.653 231.445 
R2 .000 .003 .004 
Number of cases ^ ^  
*p^0 .05 , ** p^O.Ol , *** p^O.OOl; R'= Chi Square/ -2 Log Likelihood 
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The impact of Attitude to Democracy is significant, but it depends on which 
indicator is used. Among the three indicators, general commitment to democracy has 
the most significant effect, support of direct election of CE the second {support of 
direct election of legislature is not significant), and faster pace of democratization is 
not significant. 
The relationship between general commitment to democracy and DPCV/ DPLV 
is positive, showing that supporters of democracy are more likely to be DPCV, while 
non-supporters of democracy tend to be DPLV. The same impact can also be found 
between DPCV/ DPLS, and the coefficient is even larger. However, the effect is 
insignificant between DPCV/ DPLA. 
Support of direct election of CE has similar effect as general commitment to 
democracy. Supporters of direct election of CE are more likely to be DPCV, while 
non-supporters of direct election of CE tend to be DPLV. The effect is significant and 
larger with DPCV/ DPLS, but less significant and smaller with DPCV/ DPLA. 
Support of direct election of legislature is not significant at all. Contrasting with the 
effect of support of direct election of CE, it shows CE election is better than 
legislative election to measure one's support to democratic election in Hong Kong. 
Faster pace of democratization has no significant effect. It may be due to the 
73 
difference on this dimension is too sophisticated and small to make DP voters to 
change the voting decision. 
In short, only general commitment to democracy and support of direct election of 
CE are good indicators of the attitude toward democracy. But their effects are more 
apparent on DPCV/ DPLS, rather than DPCV/ DPLA. This shows that such attitudes 
are influential when DP voters decide to switch choices. However, they are less 
effective when DP voters decide to abstain. 
Among the three indicators of change of belief to democracy due to crises, only 
stronger belief in democracy due to crises has a significant effect. Stronger belief in 
democracy due to crises has a negative impact on DPCV/ DPLV, demonstrating that 
people with stronger belief in democracy due to crises are more likely to be DPCV, 
while those with weaker belief in democracy due to crises are more likely to be DPLV. 
The effect of the dependent variable is similar with DPCV/ DPLA. However, it has no 
significant effect on DPCV/ DPLS. 
For trust in SAR government, only trust in CE has an impact. Meanwhile, the 
effect of trust in CE is only found on DPCV/ DPLS. The relationship is positive that 
people with lower trust in CE are more likely to be DPCV, while those with higher 
trust in CE are more likely to be DPLS. 
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Before we move to multivariate analysis, let's summarize the findings so far. 
1. Mistrust in Beijing has no significant effect at all; 
2. Attitude toward democracy is influential, but general commitment to democracy 
and support of direct election of CE are better indicators. Their effects are more 
notable and particularly on DPCV/ DPLS; 
3. The impact of change of belief to democracy due to crises is vital, but only the 
indicator of stronger belief in democracy due to crises has effect. It is limited on 
DPCV/ DPLA; 
4. Trust in SAR government is effective，but confined to DPCV/ DPLS. Moreover, 
trust in CE is a better indicator than trust in high-ranked officials on this 
dimension. 
Multivariate Analysis 
Bivariate analysis does not tell the independent effect of a variable if other 
independent variables are present at the same time. Multivariate analysis can serve 
this purpose. It shows the independent effect of each explanatory variable on the 
dependent variable(s) controlling the effect of other independent variables in the same 
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equation. 
I include the better indicators of the political attitudes in the multivariate analysis 
only. Since under attitude toward democracy, general commitment to democracy and 
support of direct election of CE are with similar effect, they will be put in two 
different models. Therefore, independent variables included in the multivariate 
analysis are: mistrust in Beijing, general commitment to democracy (in Model 1)， 
support of direct election of CE (in Model 2)，stronger belief in democracy due to 
crises, trust in CE, and three demographic variables including sex, age and education. 
The results are shown in Table 5.2. 
The result is quite different from that of bivariate analysis. Let me go into 
details of Model 1 of DPCV/ DPLV first. Results of other models will be given in a 
similar way and only the differences will be highlighted. 
In Model 1 of DPCV/ DPLV, the three demographic variables remain 
insignificant, and the political attitude variables are still significant and with the same 
effect. However, mistrust in Beijing, which is insignificant in bivariate analysis, turns 
to be significant here. What does it mean? 
If an independent variable XI appears to be not effective on a dependent variable 
Y in bivariate analysis, but significant when controlling the effect of another 
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independent variable X2，X2 is called a suppressor variable of XI. It means X2 
suppresses the effect of XI on Y. In this case, both XI and X2 have positive 
relationships with Y. At the same time, XI and X2 are negatively correlated with each 
other. For this reason, an increase in X2 brings about an increase in Y but a decrease 
in XI. However, simultaneously, a decrease in XI leads to a decrease in Y. As a result, 
change in Y is balanced out. Therefore, if not controlling the effect of X2, the effect 
of XI is suppressed.^ 
Table 5.2 Multivariate Logistic Regression: Statistics Summary 
Independent variables Dependent variables  
DPCV(O)/ DPLV(l) DPCV(O)/ DPLS(l) DPCV(O)/ DPLA(l)  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
^ 7m 7m ^T^ 
Age -.019 -.022 -.030* -.033* -.012 -.015 
Education -.119 -.168 -.424 -.487 .099 .074 
Mistrust in Beijing .635* .750** .627 .704* .565 .725* 
(1 strongly trust -
4 strongly mistrust) 
General commitment to .716* .782* .532 
democracy (1-yes; 2-no) 
Support of direct election -.792** -.753* . 804* 
ofCE ‘ 
(1 strongly disagree -
4 strongly agree) 
Belief more in democracy -.567* -.486* -.343 -.272 -.741** -.670* 
due to crises 
(1 believe less -
3 believe more) 
Trust in CE .335* .295 .566** .514* .104 .061 
(1 highly mistrust -
4 highly trust) 
Constant -1.246 2.002 -1.932 1.529 -1.434 1.499 
Chi-square 26.344 27.135 26.140 25.007 15.441 17.821 
-2 Log Likelihood 324.194 323.404 230.693 231.825 211.606 209.227 
R2 .081 .084 .113 .108 .073 .085 
Number of cases 253 253 ^ ^ m 181 
**p^O.Ol, ***p^O.OOl 
Chi Square/ -2 Log Likelihood 
6 For details of discussion on suppressor variable, please consult Babbie (1992:422-4). 
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In the present study, the variables general commitment to democracy, stronger 
belief in democracy due to crises, and trust in CE are suppressor variables of mistrust 
in Beijing. Both general commitment to democracy and trust in CE are negatively 
correlated with mistrust in Beijing. The Pearson Correlations are -.099 and -.241 
respectively (both significant at .000 level). However, all mistrust in Beijing, general 
commitment to democracy and trust in CE are positively correlated with DPCV/ 
DPLV. Following the above logic, the effect of mistrust in Beijing on DPCV/ DPLV is 
suppressed by the other two variables. 
Stronger belief in democracy due to crises is a suppressor variable of mistrust in 
Beijing too, but the reason is just the opposite. Stronger belief in democracy due to 
crises and mistrust in Beijing are positively correlated (Pearson Correlation = .153， 
significant at .000 level). At the same time, stronger belief in democracy due to crises 
is negatively correlated with DPCV/ DPLV, while that of mistrust in Beijing is 
positive. As a result, the effect of mistrust in Beijing on DPCV/ DPLV is again 
balanced out. 
We can see that all political attitude variables included in Model 1 of DPCV/ 
DPLV have independent effects on DPCV/ DPLV, even other variables are controlled. 
Except mistrust in Beijing, all political attitude variables are in the same directions as 
speculated. DP voters in 1998 who are supporters of democracy, with stronger belief 
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in democracy due to crises and higher mistrust in CE are more likely to vote for DP 
again in 2000; otherwise, they are more likely not to vote for DP again. However, the 
effect of mistrust in Beijing is just opposite to hypothesized. The positive sign of 
mistrust in Beijing means that DP voters with higher mistrust in Beijing are more 
likely to leave DP. On the contrary, DP voters with higher trust in Beijing tend to stay 
in DP. Why? This question would be attempted at the last of this chapter. 
In Model 2 of DPCV/ DPLV, the results are similar except that trust in CE 
becomes insignificant. It is easy to understand. Using support of direct election ofCE 
as the indicator of attitude toward democracy, it is certainly closely related to trust in 
CE. These two are negatively correlated (Pearson Correlation = -.252, significant 
at .000 level). The support of CE election decreases with the trust in CE. Therefore, 
the effect of trust in CE can be expressed through support of direct election ofCE. 
In the two models of DPCV/ DPLS，one thing should be pointed out that age has 
shown its significance for the first time in the study. Younger DP voters are more 
likely to switch choice rather than to stay. It may be due to younger people are less 
stable in political stances. They are inclined to be wavering in political decisions. Old 
people，once have supported a political party, are more likely to stick to their choices. 
Nevertheless, the effect of age on the change of voting behavior of DP voters should 
not be exaggerated, since its magnitude of coefficient is very small compared with 
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other significant variables. 
The effect of age is shown only in multivariate analysis but not in bivariate 
analysis. The reason is similar to that of mistrust in Beijing. Younger people are more 
mistrust in Beijing (Pearson Correlation = -.145, significant at .000 level), and in CE 
(Pearson Correlation = .180，significant at .000 level), and more supportive to direct 
election of CE (Pearson Correlation = -.066, significant at .005 level). The effect of 
age is hence suppressed by these variables in bivariate analysis. 
In Model 1 of DPCV/ DPLA, only stronger belief in democracy due to crises is 
significant, while the effects of other variables vanish. In Model 2 of DPCV/ DPLA, 
three variables are significant. They are mistrust in Beijing, support of direct election 
ofCE，and stronger belief in democracy due to crises. 
A major difference between the results of DPCV/ DPLS and DPCV/ DPLA is 
that stronger belief in democracy due to crises is insignificant in the former but 
significant in the latter; while trust in CE is significant is just the opposite. A possible 
explanation is that the non-supportive attitude to democracy of DPLS is not a result of 
recent governing crises. It may be resulted well before crises. However, it can only be 
proved by time-series data of the same individuals which is not available here. The 
difference on trust in CE is easier to be understood. DPLA does not show a higher 
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trust in CE compared to DPCV. The same level of mistrust in CE together with the 
declined belief in democracy make DPLA doubt the whole political system as well as 
election, so they choose to abstain. 
The hypothesis proposed in the last chapter is proved to be partially correct only. 
It is true that DP voters with a higher support to democracy and higher mistrust in the 
SAR government are more likely to stay in DP. On the contrary, DP voters with a 
lower support to democracy and lower mistrust in the SAR government are more 
likely to leave DP. 
However, the finding of the effect of mistrust in Beijing contrasts with the 
speculation. DP voters with a higher mistrust in Beijing are more likely to leave. 
Before we come to conclusion, we have to deal with this problem. 
The first suggested answer is the operationalization of the variable. Since in the 
PAS 2000, there is no direct question of trust or mistrust in Beijing, the study uses the 
attitude towards the intervention of the Central government in the SAR affairs instead. 
This may lead to error of measurement of the variable tested. That means the effect 
found out cannot be taken as the effect of trust or mistrust in Beijing directly. 
However, this suggestion cannot answer fully, because this cannot prevent us to 
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accept the actual effect of the variable (operationalized by our measurement). The 
effect may not be that of trust or mistrust in Beijing, but the effect of attitude towards 
intervention of the Central government in the SAR affairs cannot be denied. Therefore, 
we can revise the finding: the more in favor with the autonomy of the SAR, the more 
likely DP voters would leave DP. 
Such revision does not seem to help too much, still. DP, in our common 
understanding, is more favorable with the autonomy of the SAR. Then, how come the 
less favorable with the autonomy of the SAR, the more likely they stay in DP? 
Therefore, beyond my understanding, I can only remain silent in this finding and let it 
be a puzzle. 
Therefore, the concluded explanation for the electoral decline of DP given in this 
chapter can be summarized in the following statement: DP voters who are less 
supportive to democracy and higher trust in the SAR government, are more 
likely to leave DP than those who have higher commitment in democracy and 




Having demonstrated and explained the electoral decline of DP, it is time to draw 
a conclusion. In this chapter, previous findings will first be summarized. Then 
limitations of the study will be highlighted. At last, implications and contributions of 
the work will be discussed. 
The Electoral Decline of DP: The Story in Summary 
The background of the electoral decline of DP is the Hong Kong disorganized 
political scene. The political party system and electorate of Hong Kong have not yet 
acquired a stable pattern. The party system is so fragmented without any dominant 
party. On the other hand, the unstable vote shares of political parties and high 
proportions of switching voters show the volatility of the electorate. 
Such a disordered picture is not difficult to understand. Firstly，a stable party 
alignment pattern needs time to be established. In most western democracies, they 
need over a century of time to institutionalize or freeze the party alignments (Upset 
and Rokkan 1967). Using an analogy, a satellite should run in an orbit, but before it 
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has been so, it needs certain time to be launched into that (Mair 2001:35). The party 
alignment of a society is just like that satellite. Time is needed to establish a stable 
pattern. Since Hong Kong is still at the very early stage of democratization, the party 
system and electorate are still at the period of stabilization or institutionalization. 
Therefore, the unclear pattern is understandable. 
Secondly, the stability of a party alignment is closely related to the social 
conditions. The close association between electoral change in western democracies 
and，the post-industrialization or post-modernization of western societies has been 
discussed in Chapter Three. The Hong Kong society experienced drastic changes in 
the 1990s. Besides the partial democratization, the handover of sovereignty and 
governing crises were the two other important changes in the past decade. To cope 
with these changes, Hong Kong people, both the mass and elites, have to keep on 
changing. 
The electoral support of DP declined under the background of such a changing 
political scene. The DP enjoyed the highest popularity in the first democratic election 
of Hong Kong's legislature in 1991. Although it was still the biggest political party in 
recent direct elections, its popular support declined gradually. Especially between the 
elections in 1998 and 2000, the decline was the most significant. At the same time, 
DAB caught up with the DP. Their difference of vote shares became smaller and 
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smaller in the last elections. The DP no longer dominates the popular support. 
Three major contextual changes took place at the moment: the partial 
democratization, the sovereignty change and the governing crises. Hong Kong is 
undergoing democratization, but that is partial in nature. The result is the deadlock 
between the executive and the legislature, and the diminishing of the influence of 
political parties in governing. This situation, together with the governing crises 
experienced after the sovereignty change, alter the attitude of the public towards 
democracy. Some think democracy is not as good as they expect, because they found 
nothing good brought by the democratization. Instead, they only see the increasing 
inefficiency of the government and worsening of the economy. At the same time, 
some people have even more aspiration towards democracy, because in the course of 
democratization, they see that there are real changes of the political environment. 
More voices of the public can be heard through the legislators and political parties. 
The confrontation among the political institutions may be only due to the partial 
nature of democratization, but not the fundamental problem of democracy. The 
changes of political contexts did change the views of the public towards democracy, 
but there is not only one direction of the change. 
Moreover, the trust in the SAR government, especially that in the CE, of the 
public changes. No doubt, the governing crises lower the most of the public's trust in 
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the SAR government and the CE. Besides, the non-popular elected nature of the CE 
and ambiguous policy towards the central-local relationship did contribute to the 
decline of trust in the SAR government and the CE. Again, the public's trust needs not 
to decrease at the same extent. Some may show higher mistrust but some may be 
lower. Nevertheless, in the course of these changing contexts of the Hong Kong 
political scene, political attitudes of the public really change. 
The electoral decline of DP was linked with the changes of political attitudes of 
DP supporters. Two major political attitudes: attitude to democracy and trust in SAR 
government were found to have an effect on the exit decisions of DP voters. In 
general, those DP voters, who are less supportive to democracy and higher trust in the 
SAR government, tend to leave DP. 
However, it was found that voters leave DP by switching choices and by 
abstention because of different reasons. The above explanation can be suitable for 
those who leave DP by switching choices, but not for those who leave by abstention. 
DP voters who leave by switching choices are those who are less supportive to 
democracy and more trust in the SAR government. In the partial democratization, 
they cannot see any advantage brought about by democracy. Instead, they see the 
confrontation between the executive and the legislature and the governing crises. On 
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the other hand, this group of people, since they have lower support to democracy, they 
have a comparatively higher trust in the non-popularly elected CE. As a result, they 
leave DP, which only chases for the idea of democracy in public impression, leave 
that political party and switch to another. 
DP voters who leave by abstention are of different reasons. Compared with the 
consistent voters of DP, they do not show significant differences in the general 
support to democracy and trust in the SAR government. However, they admit that the 
recent societal and governing crises in Hong Kong have weakened their belief in 
democracy as the best political system. This makes them lacking interest with the 
democratic election. Therefore, neither did they vote for DP nor other political parties. 
The above analysis may not be the whole explanation of the electoral decline of 
DP，but it must be part of that. It is empirically supported theoretically plausible. 
Limitations 
Every scientific study has its own limitations. This study is not an exception. I 
point out three limitations of the study: lack of "real" longitudinal data, incomplete 
explanation of the electoral decline, and the gap between the Hong Kong public and 
the DP voters. 
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Lack of "Real" Longitudinal Data 
Electoral change is the main theme of this study. Different from one-time study, 
analysis of change studies the difference between two points of time. The best method 
to study electoral change of voters is surveying on the same individuals across two 
elections. This let us know the real changes of either voting behavior or other 
explanatory factors such as political attitudes. However, we lack such a panel. 
For the change of voting behavior, I use the data provided by the respondent's 
memory. It is risky that the respondent may have wrong memory over his or her vote 
choices. The probability of wrong memory increases with the time between the 
interview taken and the election held. Moreover, the chance of forgetting the vote 
choice increases too. The percentages of "forget/ don't answer，，？ of the 2000 and 
1998 elections in PAS 2000 are 6.2% and 17.7% respectively. Hence, the reliability of 
the data is lowered. 
For the explanatory variables, I can only have the values at a specific time. For 
example, from PAS 2000, we know a respondent who is extremely distrustful of 
Beijing, not committed to democracy, and has trust in SAR government, but we don't 
know whether he/she had the same attitudes two years ago. We cannot be sure 
7 It includes those who have voted but forget the choice, who forget having voted or not, and who 
refuse to answer. ‘ 
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whether their political attitudes have changed, even he/she does change in voting 
behavior. Therefore, accurately speaking, the data only proves the relationship 
between electoral change and political attitudes, but not with changes in political 
attitudes. Of course, in the absence of "real" longitudinal data of the two variables, it 
still provides an indirect evidence over the association between the two changes. 
Incomplete Explanation of the Electoral Decline 
This study does not offer a full explanation of the electoral decline of DP. It is 
easily shown by the low explained variance of the regression analysis. Even of the 
multivariate analysis, the explained variance ( R �) r a n g e d from 7.3% to 11.3% only 
(Table 5.2). There is much room for other factors to explain the exit of DP voters. For 
example, mobilization effect of either political parties or the mass media, which is an 
important factor in voting studies, has not been investigated in this dissertation, due to 
the lack of survey data. 
It has been discussed that the aggregate change of vote share of apolitical party 
is the net result of all individual changes (p. 15-6 of this dissertation). The decline of 
DP in aggregate vote share is the result of more voters leaving than entering DP. 
Therefore, to explain the electoral decline of DP, we should find out the reasons of 
both exit and entrance of DP voters and compare their effects. The electoral decline 
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can better be explained if the effect of reasons of exit are found stronger than those of 
entrance. 
However, due to methodological difficulty^ this study has only explained the 
reasons of voters leaving DP, without tackling those entering. Can the explanation of 
exit of DP voters be equivalent to that of the electoral decline of DP? I do not deny 
that the picture of the electoral decline would be more comprehensive if both reasons 
of exit and entrance are explored. However, I argue that the exit of voters of a political 
party is an extraordinarily good indicator of its aggregate decline. It is found that the 
size of leaving voters of a political party is correlated closely with its aggregate 
change of vote share (Pearson Correlation = -.985，significant at .05 level).; The 
correlation is nearly equal to 1. Therefore, the exit should be a reliable explanation of 
the electoral decline of DP. 
Gap between the Hong Kong public and the DP Voters 
8 So far, no satisfied method to explore the reasons of entrance of voters has been found. The major 
difficulty is to find which groups of voters to contrast with. If entering voters are contrasted with 
non-voters, the too "complex" composition of non-voters lowers the salient characteristics of entering 
voters. It is not reasonable to contrast with the consistent voters either, because they are assumed to 
share the same characteristics due to the same vote choice eventually. 
9 The coefficient is based on the figures of four political parties in 1998 and 2000 elections Figures are 
calculated from Table 2.1 and Figure 2.3-6. 
Political party Aggregate change of vote share Percentage of leaving voters  
between 1998 and 2000 
ADPL 0.0% 27% 
TF 2.5% 22% 
DAB 4.2% ^  
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There is no intention to exaggerate the implication of the electoral change of DP 
voters on Hong Kong voters or even the general public. The study has only explained 
why voters leaving DP, but not electoral change behaviors of other political parties. 
Accompanied with the electoral decline of DP，there is the rise of DAB. The picture of 
the electoral change of Hong Kong voters will be more complete if the rise of DAB 
can also be explained. However, it is beyond the capability of this thes i s . � �T h e 
research of the electoral change in Hong Kong has to be continued. 
Instead，the leaving of DP voters shows an opposite direction with the Hong 
Kong mass as a whole. Careful readers may notice that the changes in political 
attitudes of the mass (Chapter Four) are quite different from that of DP leaving voters 
(Chapter Five). It is found that DP voters leave because they are with higher mistrust 
in Beijing, less support to democracy, and higher trust in the SAR government. On the 
other hand, it has been suggested that the mass in general is lifted in the trust in 
Beijing, support to democracy, and mistrust in the SAR government. Accordingly, 
there should be more people flowing into DP instead of leaving DP. However, the fact 
is the electoral support of DP declined. Why? 
I二 At the veiy early stage of the study, I tried to include the explanation of DAB. However, because of 
the methodological difficulty treating the entering voters, the attempt has been abandoned. (See also 
note 8 of this chapter.) 
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Table 6.1 Change of belief in democracy as the best political system due to crises 
Attitudinal change Hong Kong people DPLA  
Weaker than before 7.7(%) 10.3 
No change 41.5 43.1 
Stronger than before 50.8 46.6 
N 1555 55 
Source: PAS 2000 
Note: Excludes "don't understand"/ "don't know"/ "don't answer". 
The puzzle can only be resolved by a comprehensive investigation of attitudinal 
and electoral changes of the mass. Here, only a rough estimation can be given. The 
empirical study has investigated into the DP voters in 1998，which only constitute 
14.30/0 of all respondents. If calculating from the actual votes gained by DP, it is only 
about 9.4% of Hong Kong population. ^  丨 These show DP voters are only very small 
minority of Hong Kong people. Then leaving voters of DP are even a smaller fraction. 
Hence, the direction of change of political attitudes of leaving DP voters may differ 
from that of the mass without much contradiction. Table 6.1 shows an example. It 
reports the attitudinal change to democracy due to crises 丨2 of all Hong Kong people 
and DPLA (DP voters leaving by abstention). In both groups, more respondents show 
stronger belief in democracy. However, the percentage of DPLA is lower than that of 
Hong Kong people as a whole. This shows DPLA does not only have a higher 
probability of weaker belief to democracy than DP consistent voters (suggested in 
Chapter Five), but even higher than the Hong Kong mass. Therefore, it is possible 
“ T h e percentage is only estimation based on the number of votes of DP in 1998 election (634635) 
g n � = i ^ S " o g v = = l e a & o n in 1999 (6720700, figure provided by Census and Statistics Department； 
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more Hong Kong people with stronger support to democracy, but not necessarily the 
same as DP voters or even its leaving voters. That means the different directions of 
the changes of political attitudes between Hong Kong people in general and leaving 
voters of DP are not inconsistent. 
At the End.,, 
In the last part of the dissertation, I am going to discuss the implications and 
contributions of the study. Two aspects will be discussed. The first is about political 
parties and political cleavages. The voters and the mass of Hong Kong in general will 
be the focus of the second part. 
Political Parties and Political Cleavages 
The study confirms the three main political cleavages: trust in Beijing, attitude to 
democracy, and trust in SAR government, in dividing political parties. However, in 
determining electoral changes of voters, the mechanism is not so simple. The findings 
show that voters leaving DP are those who are more mistrust Beijing, less 
pro-democracy, and higher trust in SAR government. The attributes are not the same 
ends of the three cleavages. This may imply two possibilities. The first is that the 
12 For details of the content of the item, see p.69-70 of this dissertation. 
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three political cleavages do not overlap with each other. The second is that the 
mechanism of voter behavior is much more complicated than we know. Either 
suggestion requires more sophisticated studies. Nevertheless, the study provides 
confirmation on the effect of the three political cleavages. They have been proved to 
be effective even in the change of voting behavior. 
It has been repeated that the party system in Hong Kong is still fragmented and 
the electorate is volatile in the study. It shows that as the social bases of political 
parties have not been consolidated, there is still room for political parties to mobilize 
the mass to get their support. It may be disappointing to Democratic Party and 
supporters of democrats that the exit of DP supporters is due to their less 
pro-democracy stance (one of the three attitudinal changes). However, when we see 
that the general mass develop in an opposite direction (as discussed above), there may 
be light for them. I am not trying to predict the rise and fall of any political party or 
the structure of the party system in the future. What I intend to state is that since a 
stable party alignment has not yet been established, political parties can do as much as 
possible to shape its bases of support. Politics is a game of men and women. It is a 
dynamic interaction among actors that defines the result. The rise and fall of political 
parties certainly depend on the will of the mass. On the contrary, political parties with 
more political resources can alter the attitudes of the mass. 
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Hong Kong Voters and Mass 
Different from most researches about Hong Kong voting behavior which study 
single election, this study explores voter change between two elections. The 
longitudinal character of the study can be improved (see the section "lack of real 
longitudinal data" above), but it still provides new understandings about Hong Kong 
voters from a changing perspective. First, the highly volatile character of the Hong 
Kong voters is noted for the first time. Through a single election study, we know the 
behaviors of voters and non-voters in one election. However, we do not realize that 
voters of one election can be different from those of another election! Likewise, 
supporters of a political party can be very different in different elections. What 
surprises us is not that voters or supporters of a certain party are not the same, but that 
their overlapping is so small! This reminds us that behavior of voter is not static, but 
can be changed across time. 
Second，this study combines voter turnout and voter choice in one single analysis. 
So far in Hong Kong, studies of voter turnout and voter choice are separated. The 
separation implicitly assumes that a voter decide to vote or not at first, then his/her 
choice. However, the present study does not assume such order of decision of voters. 
It treats to vote or not is one of the voter choices. It starts with DP voters in 1998 and 
analyses their choices in 2000. Not to vote in 2000 is one of the choices of voters 
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those who voted in 1998. With separate studies of the voter turnout and voter choice, 
the distinctive characteristics of former DP supporters who abstain in the recent 
election cannot be shown. Voter turnout study in 2000 treats them as non-voters only, 
but their political preferences cannot be told. Voter choice study in 2000 would not 
include them, because they don't vote in 2000. Therefore, combining the voter turnout 
and voter choice in the same study presents a more complicated but comprehensive 
picture. 
Third，this study suggests that political attitudes, not only of DP voters, but the 
mass of Hong Kong in general, are changing. Specifically, the Hong Kong people 
now trust Beijing more, support democracy more and trust in the SAR government 
less than before. The changes of these political attitudes bring about significant 
consequences. The increase of trust in Beijing may help smoothing the relationship 
between Hong Kong and the Mainland China after unification. The growth of support 
to democracy may speed up democratization of Hong Kong. The increasing mistrust 
in the SAR government may force it to transform into a more efficient, effective and 
accountable government. Further studies are certainly needed to demonstrate the 
attitudinal changes of Hong Kong people and to explore their consequences. Again, it 
is beyond the scope of this study. However, one thing can be assured: Hong Kong 
people are really changing response to the changing context. 
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The electoral decline of Democratic Party serves a good case in understanding 
electoral change in Hong Kong. In a changing society, the change of voter behavior is 
related with the change of political attitudes. 
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